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Abstract: This paper is devoted to untangling some of the cross-linguistic puzzles that are associated
with temporal adverbial clauses in general, and until-clauses in particular. After a brief introduction to
the issues raised by the construction in Hungarian, the paper presents an overview of the complexities
of until-clauses and prior attempts at analyzing these. Then, an account that was first proposed in
MacDonald & Ürögdi (2009a;b; 2011) for English is presented, and it is argued that until-constructions
do not require any of the special machinery that has been proposed to explain their behavior. The analysis
outlined accounts for the properties of temporal adverbials formed with until and for without reference to
auxiliary concepts like “expletive negation” and “stativizing negation”. After this detour into English, we
return to Hungarian, where until-clauses present a more complex picture than they do in Germanic, and
we see how even these data can be accounted for without special stipulations. Finally, the results are tied
into the general picture of temporal and event relativization (cf. Haegeman & Ürögdi 2010a;b), providing
support for an analysis of a well-defined class of subordinate clauses involving operator movement.
Keywords: embedded clauses; temporal adverbials; until ; expletive negation; operator movement
Until-clauses present a number of puzzles cross-linguistically, and this pa-
per is devoted to (partially) untangling some of these. After a brief intro-
duction to the issues raised by the construction in Hungarian, I present
an overview of the complexities of until-clauses and attempts at analyzing
these cross-linguistically. Then, I review an account that was proposed in
MacDonald & Ürögdi (2009a;b; 2011) for English, and argue that until-
constructions in fact do not require any of the special machinery that has
been proposed in order to explain away their behavior. After this detour
into English, I return to Hungarian, where until-clauses present a much
more complicated picture than they do in Germanic, and show how even
these data can be accounted for without various stipulations regarding
until. Finally, I tie all this into the general picture of temporal and event
relativization (cf. Haegeman & Ürögdi 2010a;b).
The properties of temporal clauses featuring -ig ‘until, as long as’
vary greatly across regional dialects as well as individual speakers of Hun-
garian. In what follows, I limit discussion to the least restrictive dialect
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(spoken primarily in the capital city Budapest), which displays the three-
way contrast illustrated in (1). Dialectal differences are potentially very
enlightening because some speakers do not permit the entire range in (1)
and there is also variation with respect to the more complex scope and ex-
traction patterns discussed below;1 a thorough discussion of this variation,
however, falls outside the scope of this paper. Thus, most of what I have
to say below in reference to Hungarian until-constructions should be taken
as applying to this least constrained dialect of the language. After the core
discussion, I comment briefly on a more restrictive dialect of Hungarian
(spoken, roughly, in the eastern parts of the country) that only allows (1c)
out of the variants in (1). This more archaic dialect is discussed in É. Kiss
(2010) and analyzed by Lipták (2005).
In the dialect that utilizes each of the structural variants shown under
(1), I will assume that each of these structures is a productive syntactic
construct, without any special lexical or idiomatic properties:
a.(1) Itthon maradok, ameddig Emma át-jön.
home I-stay dem-wh-until Emma over-comes
b. Itthon maradok, ameddig Emma nem jön át.
home I-stay dem-wh-until Emma not comes over
c. Itthon maradok, ameddig Emma át nem jön.
home I-stay dem-wh-until Emma over not comes
‘I’ll stay home until Emma comes over.’
The three sentences in (1) appear to convey the same meaning (at least
as far as the English translation goes) but have diverging pragmatic and
semantic interpretations that, I will argue, result from different syntactic
structures. (1a) is an event relative construction with -ig where the embed-
ded clause features a punctual event, and, accordingly, the relative operator
originates outside the adverbial clause. The central idea that referential
CPs are formally event relatives (derived by short operator movement)
as opposed to speech acts is discussed in detail in Haegeman & Ürögdi
(2010a;b) among others (see references therein). A rough definition and
schematic structure is as follows.
1 In particular, Lipták (2005) explicitly says that examples like (1a), that is, un-
til-clauses without negation, are ungrammatical. This is just one indication that
Lipták analyzes a dialect distinct from mine.
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a.(2) Event relative:
A relative clause where the relativized constituent is TP, and as such, the
relative clause refers to the entire eventuality denoted by the TP. Event rel-
ativization is a syntactic operation that creates a referential proposition from
an event, which can now be used as argument.
b. Structure (adapted from Haegeman 2007):
[CP OPi C . . . [XP ti [TP . . . ]]]
Event relativization has been formalized in a number of ways in the lit-
erature, and here I will assume a derivation along the lines of (2b). The
idea is that there is an event variable housed in a functional projection
just outside TP, with which TP (= the event) stands in a predicational
relationship. This event operator moves up to Spec,CP in event relativiza-
tion. The nature of XP here is not very important for our purposes – what
matters is the starting position of the operator and its movement path, so
I will focus on these below.
The idea that (1a) involves an event relative is confirmed by the fact
that this construction does not allow the low reading in multiple embedding
constructions:
(3) Add-ig maradok, a-medd-ig mondod, hogy megjössz.
dem-until I-stay dem-wh-until you-say comp you-arrive
HR: ‘I’ll stay as long as you keep saying that you’ll arrive.’
*LR: ‘You tell me that you’ll arrive by time t. I’ll stay until time t.’
The simple event relative construction with -ig is quite straightforward
both in terms of meaning and structure. Meanwhile, the examples in (1b)
and (1c), both involving negation in the lower clause, convey different
implicatures. According to speaker intuition (to be made more precise
below) (1b) is simply a statement about two simultaneously occurring
states/activities, with no further implications. In the concrete (1b) sce-
nario, the sentence asserts that the duration of my staying home will co-
incide with Emma’s not having come over (i.e., Emma’s being somewhere
other than home). At the same time, (1c) seems to implicate (or perhaps
entail) that, once the event in the lower clause takes place, the situation
will reverse: I will leave when Emma appears. This reading is sometimes
referred to in the literature as the “switch-reading” or “actualization” (cf.
Giannakidou 2002, among others), and it is an unresolved question whether
this reading is an implicature associated with certain combinations of un-
til and negation, or an uncancelable entailment (see Giannakidou 2002
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for arguments for the latter position).2 Several authors assume that the
switch-reading is brought about by the presence of negation in the tempo-
ral clause, based on English examples like (4):
(4) John didn’t get angry until Jack broke the vase.
In (4), it appears that a necessary outcome of the situation is that John got
angry, and this happened when (or even as a result of the fact that) Jack
broke the vase. If this effect is somehow related to the presence of negation
in (4), this could mean that we would expect a contrast (1a) against (1b–
c). In Hungarian, however, (1b) – which also involves negation – normally
lacks the switch-reading, meaning that another explanation must be sought
for the strong preference for this reading in (1c).
The discussion is organized into the following sections. First, section 1
presents a brief overview of the main issues in the “until-debate” based on
relevant recent literature. The aim of the section is to outline the general
direction my analysis will take, as well as to provide sufficient context for
the issues. Section 2 presents a novel analysis of English until-constructions
and the related issues of the role of negation in these constructions, the
switch-reading and the relative positions of operator elements in these con-
structions. In section 3, I return to the Hungarian data briefly illustrated
in (1). In a nutshell, I argue that the Hungarian facts can be accounted for
without positing two homophonous -ig suffixes (I thereby join the “single-
until” line of analyses) and without appealing to “expletive negation”. I
look at syntactic and semantic differences among the three constructions
illustrated in (1). I show that the examples (1b) and (1c) are differenti-
ated structurally by the position where the negation is interpreted (higher
than its surface position for (1c)), which leads to a number of syntactic
contrasts (e.g., the scope of negation with respect to other operators, the
licensing of negative quantifiers) and semantic effects (e.g., the availabil-
ity and interpretation of temporal modifiers within the clause). I argue
that until-constructions have no special or unusual properties that neces-
sitate such extraordinary machinery as “expletive negation”, “stativizing
negation”, or “actualization”. Rather, all the relevant properties fall out of
simple assumptions about scope, focus and the position of negation.
2 On some accounts, the switch-reading is due to a cause–eﬀect interpretation associ-
ated with the construal exempliﬁed by (1c) – see, for example, Español-Echeverría
& Vegnaduzzo (2000).
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1. Overview of the “until-debate”
The exceptional semantic (and, to a lesser extent, syntactic) properties of
until among temporal connectives/adpositions, especially its interaction
with negation, have been discussed by a number of authors (see, among
many others, Piñón 1991 on Hungarian; Giannakidou 2002 on Greek and
for a good overview of the issues and the most influential proposals in the
literature; Español-Echeverría & Vegnaduzzo’s 2000 work on Spanish and
Italian; and Eilam & Scheﬄer 2007 on Hebrew). There are a few funda-
mental questions that authors do not seem to have reached a consensus
on – I briefly look at each of these in turn, and then go on to propose an
account that hopefully improves upon all of these.
1.1. How many until-like elements are there in the lexicon?
Based on English data like (5), the existence of at least two types of un-
til – durative (5a) and punctual (5b) – has been posited:
a.(5) John slept/didn’t sleep until 5 pm/until Jane left.
b. John didn’t arrive until 5 pm/until Jane left.
c. *John arrived until 5 pm/until Jane left.
Sentences like (5b) raise a number of interrelated issues. While the use
of until here has been called punctual (since the matrix verb is eventive,
unlike in (5a)), the until-clause is apparently only licit if the eventive
predicate in the matrix clause is negated (compare (5c)). This well-known
observation has led to two diverging types of explanation.
One line of reasoning says that the negation in (5b) functions as a
stativizer (cf. Mittwoch (1977) and her later work) – thus, there is only
one, durative kind of until. I will refer to this as the single-until account.
More specifically, the until-phrase or -clause supplies the endpoint to the
activity or state with which it combines. Since negation is taken to create
a state out of eventives, John didn’t arrive qualifies as a proper durative
argument for until and thus (5b) ends up being grammatical. Negation
and until are claimed to scope freely with respect to one another, yielding
two possible readings for (6a) but only one for (6b):
a.(6) John didn’t sleep until 5.
i. Neg > until : It is not the case that John slept until 5 (he woke up
earlier, or didn’t sleep at all).
ii. until > Neg: Until 5, John was awake (maybe fell asleep after).
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b. John didn’t arrive until 5pm.
i. *Neg > until : It is not the case that John arrived until 5.
ii. until > Neg: Until 5, John was in the state of not having arrived.
On this type of account, the unavailability of the Neg > until reading in
(6b) follows from the fact that until is unambiguously “durative” on this
view, so it can only combine with an eventive predicate after it has been
stativized by negation. Therefore, (5c) is out because there is no way to
felicitously combine until with arrive. According to its critics, this account
makes it difficult to formalize the “switch-reading” apparently associated
with sentences like (5b), since there is no structural or lexical difference be-
tween (5a) and (5b). Note that making negation responsible for the switch-
reading (without any further stipulations) will not help either, since the
negated version of (5a) does not obligatorily enforce this reading. Rather,
both (5a) and (5b) have the same reading (with (5a) having an additional
one, shown in (6ai)) where the sentence only makes a statement about the
period up to the point specified by the punctual argument of until (in this
case, 5 o’clock) and there is nothing more said about what happens after.
As such, on this view the switch-reading is only a pragmatic implicature
and not a strict entailment of the construction in (5b) (or the one in (5a)
for that matter).
At the same time, Giannakidou (2002), rejecting the single-until ac-
count, argues that the weakness of a Mittwoch-style analysis is precisely
that it has trouble explaining the different entailments that are associated
with (5a) and (5b). On her view, (5a) entails nothing about what hap-
pened after 5, even on the wide scope reading of until. Meanwhile, (5b)
entails a switch in the state of affairs that happens at the time specified by
the until-phrase (in this case: John was in the state of not having arrived
until 5pm, and then switched to having arrived at 5pm) and so the English
(5b) is only felicitous if John actually arrived at 5pm or soon thereafter.
This point is illustrated, among other examples, by the following contrast
(from Karttunen 1974; ex. (21) and (23), cited by Giannakidou 2002):
a.(7) Nancy remained a spinster until she died.
b.#Nancy didn’t get married until she died.
There is a strong feeling of pragmatic oddness associated with (7b) that
we do not get with (7a), and this appears to be connected to the use of a
stative in (a) and an eventive in (b) – the (b) example is strange because
(as argued by Giannakidou) it has the entailment that Mary got married
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when or immediately after she died, an entailment that is not there in
(7a).3
Instead, following Karttunen (1974), Giannakidou claims that at least
two types of until must be posited: durative-until and NPI-until. The
latter is licensed by negation in English sentences like (5b) and actually
corresponds to a distinct lexical item in Greek. In addition to being a po-
larity item, NPI-until is eventive, so it can combine with a non-durative
predicate like arrive, so, on this view, the role of negation in (5b) is sim-
ply to license this particular kind of until, and it has no effect on event
structure, with didn’t arrive still denoting a punctual event. Further, on
Giannakidou’s analysis NPI-until has the special property of leading to
the switch-reading, a lexically encoded entailment that is not associated
with durative-until (the latter only combinable with durative predicates,
and requiring no special polarity). Despite the obvious drawbacks of lex-
ical duplication of until, this type of analysis (which I will refer to as
the “NPI-until” account) has the advantage that it can explain the fact
that, whenever present, the switch-reading appears to be an obligatory
entailment, and it does not necessitate assigning a stativizing function to
negation, a problematic assumption as I discuss below. Meanwhile, though,
it becomes truly unclear what the role of negation is in examples like (5b).
It does not stativize on this account, and it also does not receive an inter-
pretation that is customary for negation – it does not negate the event of
arrival. In fact, just the opposite ends up being the interpretation, due to
the entailment, as John didn’t arrive until 5 actually seems to mean some-
thing like John arrived at 5. Hence, this analysis operates with something
that has become known as “expletive negation” – negation that is present
in the structure for formal syntactic reasons, and does not play any role
in interpretation.
As is obvious from the brief overview above, the two basic lines of
accounts – the single-until analysis and the NPI-until analysis – both have
their own benefits and drawbacks, and both are forced to make theoret-
ical assumptions and adopt machinery that are based on stipulation and
not very well applicable in other areas of the grammar. The facts are not
very clear empirically either, since tests for the semantic import of the
3 There are counterarguments presented to this example in Mittwoch (2001), who
claims that the eﬀect in (7b) and the switch-reading in general is a cancelable
implicature, as shown by examples like Mary won’t start work at her new job until
Monday, if then. According to Mittwoch, the fact that you can add if then at
the end of the example shows that the switch-reading can be canceled without
resulting in a pragmatic diﬃculty. I return to this issue below.
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switch-reading seem to go both ways, and authors often ignore the effects
of focusing, or prosody in general, when evaluating the examples. For ex-
ample, it is worth noting that focusing the adverbial clause (achieved in
English by prosodic means) brings out the “switch” entailment in (5a) just
as easily as in (5b) (contrast (8a) and (8b) with main stress indicated in
bold) – and that “not until” fronting, a syntactic means of putting focus
on the until-clause, makes the entailment obligatory (as in (8c)):4
a.(8) I won’t sleep until you get home. (I will wake up earlier and cook you dinner.)
b. I won’t sleep until you get home. (I’ll be too worried to sleep.)
c. Not until you get home will I sleep.
This suggests that the entailment is probably not construction-specific
but has close ties to focus structure, and thus the existence of the “switch-
reading” is not a reliable syntactic diagnostic for determining whether or
not we need to posit one of two until’s.
Analyses that posit lexical ambiguity of until-type elements generally
tie together two distinct properties of until: semantic restrictions on the
type of predicate/eventuality the P is able to combine with, and syntactic
restrictions on the polarity of the environment in which it occurs. It is
worth noting that these two properties need not go hand in hand. It is en-
tirely possible for until to always combine with the same two arguments (a
state/activity and an endpoint) while retaining some sensitivity to polar-
ity and other construction-specific factors. In particular, the fact that the
relative scope of negation and until does not fully explain the pragmatic ef-
fects associated with negated until-constructions does not necessarily mean
that the single-until approach should be abandoned. This brings us to the
second major issue, the role of negation.
1.2. Is there such a thing as “expletive negation”?
Given the entailment associated with (5b) above, the “expletive” nature of
the negation in these constructions has been argued for by various authors.
The argument goes like this: The role of negation in (5b) is not to stativize
the verb (arguments have been forwarded that in fact negated events are
4 Cf. Mittwoch (2001)’s suggestion that not until is in fact on its way to becoming
a focus particle in English. Also noteworthy is the fact that the element Giannaki-
dou (2002) calls NPI-until in Greek is actually a focus particle (only). See also
Declerck’s (1995) suggestion that not-until means ‘only-at’, a proposal I discuss
below.
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not stative; cf. Csirmaz (2006) among others) but only to license NPI-until.
Moreover, this instance of negation does not share with run-of-the-mill
negation its most fundamental characteristic, since it does not affect the
truth conditions in the usual way. (Concretely, in (5b) John didn’t arrive
until 5 does not mean that John did not arrive – in fact, it entails or at
least implicates just the opposite.) To avoid diverting the discussion into
unrelated territory, I will not review the relevant arguments at this point.
Suffice it to say that, in addition to semantic considerations, there are a
number of syntactic effects as well that pertain to the ‘expletive negation’
debate, some of which I look at here.
Abels (2005) discusses Russian constructions that have been claimed
to feature expletive negation. In Russian, there are two polarity-sensitive
phenomena that require local licensing: “genitive of negation” (illustrated
under (9) and ni-phrases (negative quantifiers) as shown in (10) (examples
from Abels):
a.(9) Ivan ne čitaet Xžurnal/ Xžurnala.
Ivan neg reads journal-acc journal-gen
‘Ivan doesn’t read the journal/a journal.’
b. Ivan čitaet Xžurnal/ *žurnala.
Ivan reads journal-acc *journal-gen
‘Ivan reads the journal/a journal.’
c. Ivan ne skazal, čto on čitaet Xžurnal/ *žurnala.
Ivan neg said that he reads journal-acc *journal-gen
‘Ivan didn’t say that he reads the journal/a journal.’
a.(10) Ivan ničego ne znaet.
Ivan ni-what neg knows
‘Ivan doesn’t know anything.’
b. *Ivan ničego znaet.
Ivan NI-what knows
c. *Fedja ne skazal, čto on ničego znaet ob ètom.
Fedja neg said that he ni-what knows about that
The examples in (9) and (10) show that, in the majority of cases, geni-
tive of negation (GoN) and ni-words pattern identically in that they both
require a clause-mate licensing negation in order to be felicitous. More pre-
cisely, the environments where GoN is licensed constitute a proper subset
of the ones where ni-words are acceptable (as GoN is not grammatical in
all argument positions, see Abels for discussion). Accordingly, we do not
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expect to find constructions where GoN is acceptable but ni-words are not
licensed; however, as noted in Brown & Franks (1995), such environments
exist, with so-called “polar questions” being one of them:
a.(11) Ne/ *∅ kupil li Petr žurnala?
neg bought q Petr journal-gen
‘Did(n’t) Petr buy a journal?’
b. *Ne/ *∅ znaet li nikto iz vas, kak èto delaetsja?
neg know q ni-who of you how this is-done
intended: ‘Do(n’t) any of you know how to do this?
In (11), where negation is clearly in the CP-domain as it occurs left of the
particle li, GoN is licit (11a) but the ni-word nikto is ungrammatical (11b).
Abels discusses a number of other examples but this one will suffice for
our discussion here. Brown and Franks (1995) (among other authors; see
Abels (2005) for references) propose for such constructions that negation
here lacks negative force, so it is a case of expletive negation. These authors
claim that GoN can be licensed by this formal instance of negation but
negative quantifiers cannot, as these polarity items require local licensing
by semantic negation. In contrast, Abels argues that expletive negation
is an unnecessary and semantically unlikely complication to the syntactic
model. Instead, he proposes an account that posits only one type of nega-
tion (the usual kind) that originates in the same designated functional
projection in the TP-domain (call it NegP) in every case. Based on elab-
orate argumentation that I will not review here, he posits that ni-words
are licensed at LF in a local relationship to negation, while GoN is subject
to what he calls ‘on-line’ licensing (basically, licensing at any particular
point in the derivation). This means that “If negation starts out clause
internally, then it will be able to license GoN [on the object]. If it then
moves to a position outside of TP and is prevented from reconstructing,
ni-phrases will be disallowed” (op.cit., 48). This is what happens, Abels
argues, in cases like (11), where there is independent evidence that this
high instance of negation does not reconstruct, and takes scope in the CP-
domain. Since the ni-word needs to be in a local relationship with negation
at LF, negation that is interpreted outside TP will not be able to license it,
hence the asymmetry between GoN and ni-word licensing in constructions
like (11) is derived.
The resulting account derives the fact that negation that is too high at
LF does not license NPIs that require clause-mate licensing, a phenomenon
that had previously been attributed to the “expletive” nature of negation
in these contexts. Abels goes on to argue that the same explanation can
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be extended to until-constructions in Russian, where negation inside the
until-clause has the same odd properties as CP-level negation in polar
questions – despite the presence of negation that, at least on the surface,
appears to be inside the TP-domain of the until-clause, ni-words are out
in these constructions:
(12) Ja podoždu poka {Xkto-nibuď/ *nikto} ne pridet.
I will-wait until who-nibud’ ni-who neg arrive
‘I will wait until someone comes.’
Abels assimilates the ungrammaticality of the ni-word in (12) to (11b).
The mechanism required for this to work is covert Neg-raising whereby, in
a well-defined set of instances, negation can raise from its surface position
and take a higher scope position at LF. Due to this LF Neg-raising, nega-
tion ends up in just the configuration that we witnessed in (11), namely,
at LF it is too high to enter into a local licensing relationship with the
ni-word in question. I return to the technicalities of covert Neg-raising in
section 3. The point here is simply that there are syntactic alternatives to
accounts that rely on positing expletive negation, and that, to the extent
that they are tenable and cover the data, accounts that do not employ the
concept of expletive negation are to be preferred on grounds of theoretical
simplicity.
In general, there is no clear consensus on what exactly is “expletive”
about seemingly spurious occurrences of negation. From a semantic per-
spective, negation that does not alter the truth conditions of the clause it
appears in is usually claimed to be expletive. In this sense, if the truth-
conditions of the sentence differ depending on the presence or absence of
negation, then this instance of negation cannot be considered expletive. For
example, if it can be shown that until-clauses featuring negation have dif-
ferent entailments from their unnegated counterparts, then such examples
would not be instances of expletive negation for sure. Whatever the case
may be, we can only evaluate whether or not negation makes its ‘usual’
contribution in a particular construction if we know what interpretive ef-
fect we expect negation to contribute and how to diagnose that effect. In
turn, the interpretation we can reasonably expect from negation depends
on its syntactic position – both in surface syntax and at LF. Thus, I focus
on this question below.
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 60, 2013
314 Barbara Ürögdi
2. Against “stativizing negation”, “expletive negation” and “NPI-until”
In MacDonald & Ürögdi (2011).5 we outline a novel account of phenom-
ena mentioned in the introductory section above, and which have been
discussed under the labels stativizing negation, expletive negation and
the licensing of NPI-until or eventive until. We argue that these con-
cepts are theoretically undesirable as well as descriptively inadequate be-
cause (a) negation does not affect event structure, (b) duratives normally
outscope negation (and thus cannot be NPIs), and (c) the properties as-
cribed to negation and/or until are observed in a wider variety of contexts
(hence not lexical properties of either). Our account builds on the idea
that until- and for-duratives take their scope in the topic field (outside
TP-level operators) and can receive a contrastive interpretation on anal-
ogy with regular topics, yielding the switch-reading. As such, our account
is a “single-until” account in the sense that we do not posit lexical dupli-
cation of until. The account is also related in spirit to Abels’s treatment
of expletive negation since we attempt to derive “special” properties of
negation such as its apparent stativizing effect and interactions with un-
til-phrases (“licensing” and “switch-reading”) from independently relevant
facts like LF-scope and focus structure.
The structure of the discussion below is the following. In section 2.1,
I show that negation does not affect event structure, and in section 2.2, I
argue that in examples that have been claimed to feature NPI-until, nega-
tion is in fact outscoped by the durative, and thus cannot be considered a
licensor in the usual sense. In section 2.3, I show that the effects that are
observed with until-clauses obtain with for-clauses equally, and that these
effects are not related to the presence of negation in any relevant way since
they also occur in the presence of only-focus, prosodically marked focus,
and universal quantification. 2.4 discusses the implications of our account
for the until-debate, and leads back to Hungarian until-clauses.
2.1. Negation does not stativize
Durative adverbials are generally taken to be incompatible with telic pred-
icates, as shown in (13):
(13) John arrived #for 10 minutes/#until 2pm.
5 Most of the discussion in section 2 comes from MacDonald & Ürögdi (2011), with
modiﬁcations only where the current discussion requires.
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 60, 2013
Adverbial clauses with -ig and the “until-puzzle” 315
Interestingly, as de Swart (1996); Krifka (1989); Mittwoch (1977); Verkuyl
(1993), among others, observe, in the presence of negation, these duratives
become compatible with telic predicates – and this property holds the same
way for for and until adverbials:
(14) John didn’t arrive for 10 minutes/until 2pm.
Recall from the discussion of until-constructions that examples like (14)
with until have been at the center of the debate on the interaction of nega-
tion and until, with one camp claiming that this is an instance of expletive
negation whose role is to license NPI-until, and the other camp arguing
that negation here stativizes the punctual predicate arrive, rendering it
compatible with a durative like until. Notably, the first explanation has,
to the best of my knowledge, not been proposed for for-phrases, so no
account has been put forward arguing that for-phrases are NPIs despite
the fact that the two kinds of duratives behave more or less identically in
every relevant respect, as we will see in what follows.
In event structure literature, one approach to the role of negation
in (14) is that it turns eventive predicates into stative predicates (see de
Swart 1996 and Verkuyl 1993). Support for stativizing negation builds
on Dowty’s (1979) observation that stative predicates are true down to in-
stants; i.e., they have the subinterval property. For example, if John owned
a house for 3 months, it is true for any instant of those 3 months that John
owned a house. The same holds for the negated predicate in (14): for any
instant of the period of 10 minutes/until 2pm it is true that John didn’t
arrive. As I discuss above for until-constructions, the so-called stativizing
effect of negation has been utilized in order to explain the compatibil-
ity of until-phrases with punctual predicates without having to posit two
different kinds of until (see Mittwoch 1977).
However, convincing arguments have also been presented – both in
event structure literature and works dealing specifically with until – that
negation does not “stativize” the predicate or affect event structure in
any way (see, among others, Csirmaz 2009; Giannakidou 2002; Karttunen
1974). Putting a new spin on arguments attempting to derive the relevant
facts without positing stativizing negation, MacDonald & Ürögdi (2009a;b;
2011; henceforth M&Ü) argue that (14) features neither “stativizing nega-
tion” nor “expletive negation” acting as a licensor for the until-phrase.
Before going into the details of the account, let me go through some sim-
ple arguments to show that, in a literal sense at least, negation does not
stativize.
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To start, observe a well-known contrast between eventive and stative
predicates in the present simple in English in (15):
a.(15) #John drops the book. b. John owns a car.
c. #John doesn’t drop the book.
The eventive predicate in (15a) is only felicitous on a habitual interpre-
tation, hence the infelicity of (15a) out of the blue. In contrast, statives
do not require a habitual interpretation to be felicitous, as illustrated in
(15b). As Csirmaz (2006; 2009) observes, when the eventive is negated,
as in (15c), it is still only felicitous on a habitual interpretation, which is
unexpected if negation creates a state out of eventives, since in this case
we would expect a negated eventive to pattern with statives, which is not
the case.
Consider another contrast between statives and eventives in the ad-
vancement of the action of the narration (Kamp & Reyle 1993):
(16) Joan glanced at her car. (i) She took a picture. (ii) She was happy.
The eventive in (16i) advances the action: it is understood that the pic-
ture is taken after glancing at the car. In contrast, the stative in (16ii)
does not necessarily advance the action; that is, being happy can co-occur
with glancing at the car. As Kamp & Reyle (1993) and Csirmaz (2006,
2009) observe, negated eventives pattern like their non-negated eventive
counterparts in that they advance the narrative in the same way:
(17) Joan glanced at her car. She didn’t take a picture.
If negation did turn eventive predicates into stative predicates, we would
not expect this advancement of narration but it should be possible to
understand the negated eventive as simultaneous with the first event.
Based on such examples (and others not cited here), M&Ü conclude
that, at least in a literal sense, negation does not ‘stativize’, leaving the
availability of durative adverbials with negated eventive predicates with-
out an explanation. Or rather, the fact that negation does not actually
create states out of eventives suggests that the generalization made about
examples like John didn’t arrive until 5 is misguided, and needs to be re-
examined. One option is to revert to the NPI-until analysis and assume
that negation in these examples is expletive, and is only present in order
to license the until-phrase. Apart from the obvious problems (the fact that
we need to posit not only two until’s but also two for ’s, given that for-
adverbials are also licit with negated eventives), this position is untenable
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also because of other reasons. Namely, arguments can be provided that
negation actually scopes under the duratives in these cases.
2.2. The HighDur effect: duratives scoping over negation
Karttunen (1974) and Mittwoch (1977; 2001) observe that negation and
durative adverbials scopally interact, so in many cases they take scope
freely with respect to each other. Consider the sentence in (18):
(18) John didn’t sleep for an hour/until 3pm.
(i) Dur > Neg: there was a period of an hour/up to 3pm of no sleeping by John
(ii) Neg > Dur: John slept less than an hour/until a time before 3pm
The predicate in (18) is atelic, and there are two interpretations depending
on whether negation scopes over or under the durative. Now reconsider the
datum from (14): the duratives are compatible with the predicate arrive
in the presence of negation, but only one of these two scope relations is
available:
(19) John didn’t arrive for an hour/until 3pm.
(i) Dur > Neg: there was a period of an hour/up to 3pm of no arrival by John
(ii) Neg > Dur: John arrived for less than an hour/until a time before 3pm
Only when the durative scopes over negation is there an available inter-
pretation; this is what M&Ü label the HighDur effect or HighDur reading,
a label that I adopt here. For now, let us take it simply as a descriptive
observation that in the configuration we are interested in – the combina-
tion of a negated eventive and a durative adverbial – the durative scopes
higher than negation. Mittwoch (1977) takes this as evidence that negation
stativizes, since it combines with the predicate first, and only this negated
(i.e., in her terms “stativized”) predicate can combine with the durative.
M&Ü argue, however, that – in addition to the fact that negated even-
tives do not pattern with statives – the original observation, namely that
punctual predicates cannot felicitously combine with durative adverbials,
is also misleading and should be reevaluated. They show that the fact that
the durative cannot combine first in examples like (19) is arguably because
the particular telic predicate arrive disallows an iterative interpretation.
Consider the two telic predicates in (20):
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a.(20) #John arrived for an hour/until 3pm.
b. John missed a note for an hour/until 3pm.
(20a) cannot be interpreted iteratively because it is pragmatically odd to
arrive repeatedly for a period of time without contextual support. On the
other hand, repeatedly missing the same note requires little contextual
help (as it is easy to imagine the relevant situation), thus an iterative
interpretation is readily available for (20b), and the durative is compatible
without any problems. As expected, with miss a note negation and the
durative show the same scopal interaction observed with atelic predicates,
as shown in (21):
(21) John didn’t miss a note for an hour/until 3pm.
(i) Dur > Neg: there was a period of an hour/up to 3pm of no note missed by
John
(ii) Neg > Dur: John kept missing a note for less than an hour/until a time before
3pm
Based on examples like (21), it appears that the “free scopal order” of du-
ratives with respect to negation is more general, and available regardless
of the telicity of the predicate. That is, negation need not stativize for the
HighDur reading to obtain. Rather, with certain predicates (namely, even-
tives that do not allow an iterative interpretation) one scope relation is
not felicitous – but this is due to the pragmatics of ‘arrival’, and not to the
syntactic requirements of the durative, which can happily combine with a
telic predicate (as shown in (20b)). Therefore, based on the arguments in
the previous section that negated eventives do not actually become stative,
and on the fact that we do not need to posit a stativizing effect of negation
in order to explain the compatibility of durative adverbials with eventive
predicate, M&Ü conclude that we can safely eliminate “stativizing nega-
tion” from the theory, and set out to explore the scope relations in (20a–b).
Another outcome of the reasoning above is that we have no evidence for
positing “eventive” and “durative” until as two separate lexical items since
until can combine with eventives and duratives equally.
The first question is: when the durative outscopes negation, how does
this happen and where exactly does the durative take scope? To start, for
and until duratives clearly take scope outside vP. In this respect, they are
H(igh)-duratives, and as we will see, they contrast in several respects with
L(ow bare)-duratives (e.g., an hour). First, observe that L-duratives are
compatible with atelic predicates:
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a.(22) John slept an hour.
b. John swam 10 minutes.
Nevertheless, as Morzycki (2004) points out, unlike H-duratives, L-dura-
tives can only be interpreted under negation, illustrated in (23), so the
variable scope we saw in (18) does not obtain:
(23) John didn’t sleep an hour.
(i) L-Dur > Neg: there was a period of an hour of no sleeping by John
(ii) Neg > L-Dur : John slept less than an hour
Observe that even with negation L-duratives are not compatible with a
telic predicate that cannot be interpreted iteratively (Csirmaz 2006):
a.(24) *John didn’t arrive an hour.
b. John didn’t arrive for an hour.
These facts suggest that H-duratives are structurally higher than L-du-
ratives (see also Morzycki 2004). Why should H-duratives be high in the
structure, outscoping predicate negation, and L-duratives obligatorily low?
M&Ü posit that H-duratives are referential in nature, identifying a subin-
terval of the reference time, while L-duratives are predicative in nature,
measuring the run time of event (Morzycki 2004; Csirmaz 2009). First, ob-
serve that H-duratives allow deictic modification, while L-duratives do not:
(25) John danced #(for) those thirty minutes.
Second, the subinterval of time identified by H-duratives must be a con-
tiguous stretch of time, while this is not the case for L-duratives. Consider
a context in which studying took place yesterday afternoon from 12 to 1
and from 4 to 5. In this context, (26a) with the H-durative is infelicitous,
while (26b) with the L-durative is perfectly fine.
a.(26) #John studied for 2 hours yesterday afternoon.
b. John studied 2 hours yesterday afternoon.
Note, moreover, that the contiguous subinterval interpretation is the only
one available in the presence of negation, illustrated in (27).
(27) The guests didn’t arrive for two hours.
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In the context of a party (whose duration provides the reference time),
(27) cannot be uttered when there are two one-hour stretches of time, one
at the beginning and one at the end of the party, during each of which
no guests arrived. It can only be uttered when there is a contiguous two-
hour stretch with no arrivals. Moreover, this contiguous stretch typically
contrasts with a distinct stretch of the same reference time, shown by the
continuations of (27) in (28).
a.(28) . . . so we closed the doors and turned oﬀ the lights.
b. . . . but then they started pouring in.
I return to the nature of the contrastive reading on the durative below.
What is important now is that the interpretation we see here is typical
of referring expressions in the topic field: they take their reference from a
contextually or explicitly defined set of relevant objects, here, (stretches
of) time.
M&Ü conclude that the HighDur effect is simply a scope configura-
tion, requiring no auxiliary explanations. We now turn to a more precise
syntactic and semantic characterization of this construction.
2.3. HighDUR effect not specific to negation and for/until
Recall the implications of M&Ü’s analysis for until-constructions. The re-
sults shown above are incompatible with both the “expletive negation/NPI-
until” and the “stativizing negation” types of analyses. Negation cannot
be claimed to license these duratives since the HighDUR effect is a config-
uration in which the durative outscopes negation. It has also been shown
that the ungrammaticality of (13) is not due to the predicate’s telicity
because telic predicates that lend themselves to an iterative interpretation
do not require negation to be combinable with a durative (e.g., miss a
note). I now present M&Ü’s semantic proposal, which is compatible with
the HighDUR configuration, and accounts for the contrasts in (20) as well
as the “switch-reading” observed with these constructions – without refer-
ence to stativizing or expletive negation. The main point of this section
is to show that explanations building on special properties of negation
or lexical features of until or duratives in general cannot be on the right
track primarily because the particular interpretation associated with the
interaction of negation and until actually obtains in a much wider set of
contexts.
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It has been noted that, in addition to negation, only focus can also
“license” duratives with eventive predicates (i.e., yield the HighDUR effect)
(see Csirmaz 2006; 2009). Consider (29).
a.(29) Only John arrived for an hour/until 3pm.
b. John only locked the door for a week/until yesterday.
While (29a), for one, clearly does not favor an interative reading, only
may share some properties with negation (see, e.g., Heycock 2005), possi-
bly suggesting an account of (29) in terms an element of negation in this
operator (cf. Csirmaz 2006). Interestingly, however, unmarked (prosodi-
cally marked) focus (30a), universal quantifiers (30b), and exactly numerals
(30c) also give rise to the relevant scope configuration:
a.(30) John locked the door for two weeks/until last night.
b. Everyone failed the test for two weeks/until last week.
c. (Exactly) ﬁve students came to my oﬃce hours for a year/until last week.
Negation is clearly not useful in explaining these facts, as these environ-
ments are not usually assumed to involve negation on any level (syntactic
or semantic), and appealing to the subinterval property of the event de-
scription is also not going to help.6 In (30a), for example, it is not the case
that at every instant of the two-week period/until last night, John locked
the door. Rather, we need to look at relevant situations occurring during
the two week period/until last night and then ask if John locked the door
is true at that situation. Dowty (1979, 82–83) observes the importance of
such relevant situations in the interpretation of for : he claims they are
“both vaguely specified and also contextually determined”, as illustrated
in (31).
a.(31) John has been working in San Diego for the last ﬁve years. He usually spends
his weekends at the beach.
b.#John has been serving his prison sentence for the last ﬁve years. He usually
spends his weekends at the beach.
Since the workweek (typically) excludes the weekends, one can work in
San Diego and still spend weekends at the beach, in contrast to the normal
state of affairs for prison sentences. So for the last ﬁve years is evaluated
6 Some of the data in this section contradicts Csirmaz’s (2006) observations. M&Ü
comment on this by saying that the reason for this discrepancy may be that Csir-
maz failed to take into account the eﬀects of focusing in her examples.
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differently in the two cases. In the case of the HighDUR effect configura-
tion, M&Ü propose that these relevant situations are not actually vaguely
specified but are provided by the information structure of the sentence. For
example, consider cases of unmarked (i.e., prosodically marked) focus. The
information structure of the sentences in (32) is such that the focused ele-
ment provides salient alternative scenarios, while the presupposition gives
us the relevant situations where the proposition is evaluated.
a.(32) John locked the door for a month.
– presupposition: John locked something → relevant situation s
– assertion: John locked the door → event e
‘For a month, each time John locked something, it was the door (and not, for
example, the front gate or the window).’
b. John locked the door for a month.
– presupposition: John did something (i.e., took safety measure) →
relevant situation s
– assertion: John locked the door → event e
‘For a month, each time John did something relevant (e.g. took a safety mea-
sure), he locked the door.’
c. John locked the door for a month.
– presupposition: someone locked the door → relevant situation s
– assertion: John locked the door → event e
‘For a month, each time someone locked the door, that someone was John (and
not, for example, his assistant).’
At each relevant situation, different for each sentence in (32a–c) due to dif-
ferent presuppositions, there must be a door-locking event by John for the
sentences to be true. A very basic semantic formalization of the HighDUR
configuration based on these facts is provided in (33).
(33) for/until i(∃e∀s[s → e])
There is a relevant situation s, determined by the presupposition, which
mediates between the contiguous subinterval of the reference time i, iden-
tified by the H-durative, and the event e, denoted by the predicate, such
that whenever s takes place e takes place.
Now consider other operators. The classically problematic examples
involve negated and non-negated eventives, where M&Ü claim that the
difference in acceptability comes down to whether or not the semantic
structure in (33) is feasible. Contrast the examples (34)–(36) below.
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a.(34) John didn’t arrive on time for a month/until yesterday.
‘For a month/Until yesterday, every time John arrived, his arrival was not on
time.’
b. John arrived on time for a month/until yesterday.
‘For a month/Until yesterday, every time John arrived, his arrival was on time.’
a.(35) ?John arrived for a month/until yesterday.
‘For a month/Until yesterday, every time John did something relevant, it was
arrive.’
b. John missed a note for a month/until yesterday.
‘For a month/Until yesterday, every time John did something relevant, it was
miss a note.’
(36) John didn’t arrive for a month/until yesterday.
‘For a month/Until yesterday, at every relevant moment it was true that John did
not arrive at that moment.’
In (34a) and (34b) both, on time is the focus of the sentence and the
relevant situations are arrivals by John, as indicated in their paraphrases.
This interpretation is available independently of negation, since negation
here scopes over on time, and there is no negation in the (b) example;
this also shows that there is nothing in the telicity of arrive per se that
precludes it from combining with a durative (i.e., arriving on time is just
as telic as arriving). Now, the infelicity of examples like (35a) appears
to be the pragmatic difficulty in determining the relevant situations for
evaluating the truth of the predicate. M&Ü suggest that since there is
no clear presupposition, the relevant situations default to every instant
(DEI) of the stretch of time identified by the durative. Thus, there is only
the pragmatically odd interpretation that John arrived at every instant
for a month/until yesterday. Observe that this DEI interpretation holds
independently of negation since it is available for non-negated predicates
as well, illustrated in (37).
a.(37) John sneezed for ten minutes straight.
b. John slept for an hour.
No DEI interpretation arises for (35b), however, since the relevant situa-
tions are readily available: John’s attempt at playing the particular piece
containing the note his misses. M&Ü also claim that the same DEI is play-
ing a role in the presence of negation in sentences like (36) as well, such
that no arrival by John holds at every instant for a month/until yesterday.
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There is nothing pragmatically odd about this interpretation, and the sen-
tence is fine. Additionally, this DEI interpretation is precisely what gives
us the sense of expectation noted in the literature (Karttunen 1974). So,
for example, in (38) below, there is an understanding that John could have
arrived at any moment of the subinterval denoted by the HighDUR. M&Ü
propose that this is because of the DEI interpretation.
(38) John didn’t arrive for an hour/until midnight.
When it comes to universals,7 there is a gradation of acceptability based
on how easy it is to deduce the relevant situations s:
a.(39) ??Everyone arrived for two weeks/until last week.
b. Everyone arrived late for two weeks/until last week.
c. ??Everyone took the test for two weeks/until last week.
d. Everyone who came to apply for a job here took the test for two weeks/until
last week.
e. Everyone failed the test for two weeks/until last week.
In the unmarked examples (b,d,e), the relevant situations are either given
by the presupposition generated by focus (b: arrivals), or through the re-
striction on the quantifier (d: applying for a job), or via the lexical meaning
of the verb (failing the text requires taking the test). In the latter case, it
is possible to argue that there is a silent restriction on the quantifier that
is easy to reconstruct from the verb’s meaning. In (a,c), however, we need
an adequately salient context to come up with the relevant situations. In
(39a), the context might supply a restriction on the quantifier (e.g., ‘ev-
eryone who went on a daily dangerous mission threatening their arrival’),
while in (39c), we either need alternatives to ‘test’ (which is difficult) or
a restriction on the quantifier (which is provided explicitly in (39d) and
implicitly in (39e). This explains the contrasts noted in (39) straightfor-
wardly.
Turning to more complex cases, sentences with exactly + numeral
(marked ungrammatical by Csirmaz 2006) also require evaluation at (a)
relevant situation(s):
(40) (Exactly) one student came to class for a year / until last week.
This case is analogous to the focus examples: what has to hold is that at
every relevant situation s (whenever someone came to office hours – regard-
7 Thanks to Chris Piñón (p.c.) for discussions of these examples.
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less of whether it was once or on multiple occasions), it must be exactly
one (i.e., the same) student who showed up.
Based on the discussion above, the M&Ü proposal can be summa-
rized as follows. HighDURs denote a subinterval i of the reference time
during which there is a set of relevant situations s determined primarily
by the presupposition (introduced by focus or quantification, and mediated
in part by context and pragmatics) at which the assertion is said to hold
exhaustively. When there is no clear presupposition, relevant situation s
defaults to all instants of the subinterval i. On this view, the unacceptable
examples like #John arrived until 5 constitute the marked case, since they
represent environments where the construal of an interpretation is excep-
tionally difficult. There is no principled reason, however, to expect telic
predicates to be incompatible with duratives, or for negation (or stativity)
to be required. Thus, the contrast between (13) and (14) is misleading and
misinterpreted in much of the literature.
2.4. Implications for the until-debate
Finally, returning to the until-debate, let us see what the implications are
for this discussion. To recap, there are two competing analyses trying to
account for the contrast in (41):
a.(41) John didn’t arrive/*arrived until 3pm.
b. John didn’t sleep/slept until 3pm.
On one hand, it has been suggested that until is compatible with telic
predicates only in the presence of negation because there is separate lexi-
cal item until which is eventive and an NPI (the other until being durative)
(e.g., Condoravdi 2008; Giannakidou 2002; Karttunen 1974). While it is
unclear why eventivity and NPIhood should go together, this line of anal-
yses does eliminate the need for stativizing negation. On the other hand,
“single-until” accounts (e.g., Mittwoch 1977; 2001) argue that there is only
one until which can only combine with durative events – hence, negation
is required to stativize eventives in order to make them compatible with
an until-phrase.
As shown by M&Ü, both accounts incur problems in the face of the
discussion above. There is no motivation for NPI-until since the HighDUR
effect holds without negation, as noted above for unmarked focus (30a),
universal quantifiers (30b), and exactly numerals (30c). Until is also li-
censed in neutral contexts with an iteratively interpreted eventive (20b),
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thus, in contexts where no operator element is present in the structure
(especially not one that can be claimed to implicate negation somehow).
Moreover, I have shown above that duratives outscope negation in the rele-
vant environments, so it is unclear how NPI-until would be licensed anyway
in this configuration. Lastly, until patterns exactly like for in the relevant
respects, and for has not been claimed to be an NPI in the literature.
With respect to scope relations, M&Ü’s account finds itself closer to the
‘single-until’ line of accounts since the two share the insight that negation
is within the scope of the durative in examples like the grammatical (41a).
However, there is ample evidence (here and in papers cited above) that
negation does not actually stativize. Furthermore, the other environments
(focus, universals, iteratively interpreted telics) present a problem here as
well because these environments cannot be claimed to involve stativity in
any form.
Therefore, the implication of M&Ü’s account for the until-debate is
that there is only one until, which is not an NPI and has no special proper-
ties in comparison with for. It is simply a high-scoping durative, receiving
its interpretation in the referential (topic) field of the sentence, hence out-
side negation. A question that remains to be answered (and which, in
fact, is left open by single-until accounts in general) is how the so-called
switch-reading illustrated in (42) comes about:
(42) John didn’t arrive until 2pm/Sunday.
> John arrived at 2pm/on Sunday.
The proponents of NPI-until have attributed this effect to the lexical item
itself, which would then have three special and apparently unrelated prop-
erties: eventivity, NPIhood, and the switch-reading. The ‘expletive’ nature
of negation (solely an NPI-licensor) is supposed to be supported by the
switch-reading (so, on this view, (42) actually means the implicature be-
low, i.e., in [John didn’t arrive] negation is inert and does not affect the
truth conditions). Discarding the NPI-until analysis clearly leaves open
the question of how to account for the switch-reading. M&Ü propose that
the reading is actually a straightforward result of the high durative being
interpreted as a contrastive topic. Note the parallel interpretations of the
two constructions:
(43) Classic contrastive topic construction (cf. Büring 2003)
A: What did you buy in the city?
B: On 59th street I bought shoes.
Alternative: in other locations Alt.: other things
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> In some other location I bought something other than shoes.
(44) John didn’t arrive until 9.
Until 9 no John arrive
Alt.: at or shortly after 9 Alt.: YES
> At or just after 9, John did arrive.
In the topic field, H-duratives can get a contrastive reading,8 such that
the alternative introduced by the H-durative is the portion of the reference
time not covered by the H-durative: the introduction of alternatives derives
the entailment that the event “actualizes” (in (44) that John arrives). In
the case of until, the remainder of the reference time ends at or shortly
after the time point in the until-phrase, hence the strong intuition that
the ‘switch’ between John being away and John arriving has to take place
at or shortly after 9. This view is supported, once again, by the fact that
the switch-reading obtains in all relevant environments – with for as well
as until, and with operators other than negation in a similar fashion:
8 While seems clear that HighDurs in fact pattern with topics semantically, in terms
of syntax, M&Ü oﬀer no arguments to show that these duratives scope not only
outside vP (as shown above) but also outside TP. In particular, it is an interesting
question where HighDurs are positioned with respect to D&UE’s reference time
and assertion time. While I do not have much to say about this here, a potentially
enlightening route of investigation would be to see if and how such high duratives
create intervention eﬀects. It appears that they are highly marked in factive com-
plements, for example, when they are fronted but acceptable in situ:
(i) ??I resent that, until 5 John didn’t arrive.
(ii) I resent that John didn’t arrive until 5.
The non-fronted example in (ii) is perfect even with the switch-reading, which – ac-
cording to M&Ü – requires a contrastive reading on the durative. While this might
indicate that the relevant LF scope-position is lower than TP (where the event rel-
ative operator is supposed to start out), this may not be a conclusion we can draw
from these facts because, as shown in (iii)–(iv), in situ focus also does not create
intervention in English:
(iii) ??I resent that Mary John likes.
(iv) I resent that John likes Mary (and not jill).
While (iii) is only acceptable with a strong contrastive reading on the complement
clause (which, as argued in Haegeman & Ürögdi 2010a;b, results in featural enrich-
ment of the operator), (iv) is ﬁne with a neutral interpretation of the complement.
As such, in situ elements (whether raised at LF or assuming scope via a diﬀerent
mechanism) are not interveners in English. At this point, therefore, I do not have
conclusive evidence to prove or disprove the idea that HighDurs take their scope
and receive their interpretation in the topic ﬁeld, therefore, I will assume that
M&Ü’s account is essentially right.
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(45) Only John arrived / Everyone failed the test until last week.
(46) A: What happened at the party?
B: For two hours/Until about midnight, only John arrived.
> There were other relevant time periods when others arrived.
Given the parallels with contrastive topic constructions, as well as the
observation that duratives in the relevant construction scope higher than
negation, M&Ü conclude that the switch-reading is a derivative of the
focus structure of the construction at hand,9 and does not justify the
introduction of a separate lexical item (a separate until) or a special (ex-
pletive) kind of negation. M&Ü’s account is not the first one to tie the
switch-reading to focus structure: e.g., Giannakidou (2002) notes that this
special reading appears connected to focusing since in Greek, for example,
so-called NPI-until is actually a focus particle; Declerck (1995) claims that
‘not-until’ is actually a different lexicalization of ‘only-at’; and Mittwoch
(2001) suggests that ‘not-until’ in English is on its way to becoming a fo-
cus particle. A shared drawback of these earlier accounts, however, is that
9 A related issue, raised by Anikó Lipták (p.c.), is why until-phrases cannot be
focused in sentences featuring negated eventives. Observe the following example
from Hungarian:
(i) János háromig aludt/ *nem érkezett meg.
J. three-until slept not arrived prt
‘John slept until three/*didn’t arrive until three.’
As (i) shows, the focusing of the until-phrase is ﬁne with a durative predicate but
not so good with a negated eventive. While I do not have a deﬁnitive answer to
this question, the issue seems related to the fact that the switch-reading appears
to be obligatory (or at least highly preferred) with negated eventives while it is
optional with duratives:
(ii) a. I won’t take a break until 5.
b. I’ll (deﬁnitely) be working until 5 (and will probably continue after that
as well).
If this generalization is correct, this would mean (on the account I propose here)
that the until-phrase in (a) is obligatorily high up (in contrastive topic position),
and thus it is higher than the focus position and cannot be focused. Why this
correlation should hold, though, and whether it is absolute (or simply a preference)
is unclear. One way to think about it is that the correlation actually holds in the
opposite direction: until-phrases must take scope over TP but if there is negation
in the sentence, the until-phrase must be an operator (i.e., contrastive) in order
to escape the island created by negation. Hence, until-phrases that are raised over
negation are always contrastive, while until-phrases that are raised out of non-
negated VPs can be simply adjoined to TP or extracted in a similar fashion.
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they all relate these focus properties to the lexical items of negation and
until in some way, which simply misses the broader generalization that the
contrastive topicalization of any durative will yield this reading, indepen-
dently of the presence or absence of negation inside the clause, or the type
of predicate present. Therefore, we can safely conclude that none of the
auxiliary concepts that have been introduced to account for the ‘special’
properties of until-constructions (such as NPI-until, switch-reading, exple-
tive negation or stativizing negation) are required or desirable since some
of the observations that these concepts are supposed to explain are wrongly
formulated, while others can be explained without them. I now return to
the discussion of Hungarian until-constructions, which I will attempt to
treat in this spirit.
3. Three until-constructions in Hungarian
In this section,10 I discuss how the conclusions of the previous section
regarding until-constructions in English carry over to the analysis of the
Hungarian data. In particular, I will start out from the assumptions that
(a) there is only one until in the lexicon, which takes one durative and one
punctual argument (with the latter signifying the endpoint of the former),
and (b) there is no such thing as “stativizing” negation (negation does not
affect event structure) but rather, negation and duratives can take scope
over each other, and when a telic predicate is in the scope of a durative, it
must be interpreted iteratively. In what follows, I show that these simple
assumptions, coupled with the structural distinction between temporal
relativization (TR) and event relativization (ER) adverbial clauses, will
be sufficient to explain the Hungarian patterns, which are more complex
than the English ones due to the added complication of negation sometimes
being present in the until-clause. Once again, though, I will argue that
negation in until-clauses is not expletive (cf. Abels 2005) and is not a
special kind of negation in any sense.
3.1. How many until ’s?
As pointed out earlier, “single-until” analyses typically rely on two key
assumptions: (i) negation can influence aspect, in particular, a negated
10 This section draws heavily on Ürögdi (2009) but the analysis is updated based on
some recent research I have done on operator movements and scope relations in
embedding constructions.
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punctual predicate will be interpreted as durative; and (ii) various inter-
pretational effects (semantic and/or pragmatic) result from scope relations
between until, negation, and possibly other operators like focus. While I
attempt to do away with assumption (i) above, the interpretation assigned
to telic predicates in these constructions will still be a useful indicator of
the scope relations in the sentence. As for (ii), I will suggest (following
Abels 2005) that the LF position of negation is what counts for semantic
interpretation, and that focus is the crucial factor influencing the pragmat-
ics. Let us now see how we can detect scope relations in the three variants
repeated under (47).
a.(47) Itthon maradok, ameddig Emma haza-jön.
home I-stay dem-wh-until Emma home-comes
b. Itthon maradok, ameddig Emma nem jön haza.
home I-stay dem-wh-until Emma neg comes home
c. Itthon maradok, ameddig Emma haza nem jön.
home I-stay dem-wh-until Emma home neg comes
‘I’ll stay home until Emma comes home.’
From the discussion in the previous sections, the reader may recall that I
have argued for two different distributions of the suffix -ig. One instance
of this suffix (patterning with the temporal relative class) occurs when the
embedded clause features a durative (rather than punctual) predicate, for
example:
(48) Itthon maradok, ameddig Emma munkában van.
home I-stay dem-wh-until Emma work-in is
‘I will stay home as long as Emma is at work.’
(= ‘Emma is at work until time t, and I’ll stay until time t.’)
In such cases, -ig forms a temporal relative clause, where the time periods
covered by the embedded and the matrix events are in full overlap. The
event relative use of -ig (as in (47a)), meanwhile, takes a time point (when
the embedded punctual event takes place) and relates it to the duration
of the matrix event, setting it as the endpoint of the latter. Schematic
representations for these are as follows:
a.(49) Temporal relative construction with until (cf. (48))
[I will stay home [until t]i [Emma is at work [until t]i]
b. Event relative construction with until (cf. (47a))
[I will stay home until ti [ti [Emma comes home]]]
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At first glance, it seems that these two uses exemplify ‘durative’ and ‘punc-
tual’ until since in (49a) the embedded clause must involve a durative or a
stative in order to be felicitous (as the relativized element is the endpoint
of the embedded eventuality), while in (49b) the until-clause must contain
a punctual event (as the time specification of this event will constitute
the endpoint of the time period described by the matrix clause). This,
however, is not the right generalization. In fact, -ig – at least as far as the
structures in (49) attest – always takes a durative event and a point in time
as its two arguments. As suggested by (49a), a sentence like (48) involves
relativization and thereby sharing of the endpoint of both events, resulting
in a reading where the two periods overlap. Meanwhile, (49b) shows that
the event relative use of the same suffix (as in 47a) results in a structure
where a durative/stative matrix clause and a punctual embedded clause
can felicitously be connected.
This means that, so far, we have no evidence for positing two different
kinds of -ig (durative and punctual) in Hungarian, despite the fact that
the distribution of the suffix is clearly of two kinds so -ig can take either
a temporal expression or an event as its punctual argument. Of course,
(49a) is not the only possible structure that can be assigned to sentences
like (48), which could also be analyzed as an event relative involving a
different lexical item that is homophonous with the one used in (47a)
and whose meaning mirrors that of English as long as. Thus, so far we
can only say that this pair of sentences can be analyzed without positing
two argument structures for -ig (i.e., without lexical ambiguity). Still, if
we were to abandon the structural difference between (47a) and (48), we
would lose the explanation for why only the latter but not the former
allows the “low reading” to surface:
a.(50) Temporal relative construction – low reading is available
Itthon maradok, ameddig mondod, hogy Emma munkában van.
home I-stay dem-wh-until you-say comp Emma work-in is
HR: ‘I will stay home as long as you are uttering the statement that Emma is
at work.’
LR: ‘I will stay home throughout the time for which you say Emma will be at
work.’
b. Event relative construction – low reading is not possible
Itthon maradok, ameddig mondod, hogy Emma haza-jön.
home I-stay dem-wh-until you-say comp Emma home-comes
HR: ‘I’ll stay home until the time when you utter the statement that Emma is
coming home.’
LR: *‘I will stay home until the time for which you say it will be the time of
Emma’s arrival.
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Given the structures in (49), it becomes straightforward to account for the
absence of the low construal in (50b): since this structure does not involve
long operator movement, we do not expect the low reading to be avail-
able. (For a detailed discussion of the unavailability of the ‘low reading’
in event relatives – including temporals, conditionals and factives – I refer
the reader to Haegeman & Ürögdi 2010a;b.) If we were to hypothetically
entertain an account of (50a) that posits an event relative derivation fea-
turing a lexical item similar to the English ‘as long as’, this would leave the
availability of the low construal in this example without an explanation.
The importance of positing a single lexical item with uniform selectional
properties will become even clearer below, when I discuss the derivation of
(47c). So I now turn to the issue of negation in until-clauses in Hungarian.
3.2. The role of negation
First, we now turn to the negated example (47b) to see whether the “sin-
gle-until” approach can work here as well. In what follows, I will refer
to this variant as the “predicate negation” type, as this example features
negation in its normal position, left-adjacent to the tensed verb, which is in
turn followed by the verbal particle – in contrast to the Prt–Neg–V order
in (47c). (I return to the issue of the word order difference between the two
variants below.) As background to the discussion, it should be noted that,
just like in English, punctual predicates are normally compatible with ad-
verbials like egyszer csak ‘all of a sudden’, while duratives do not easily
tolerate such modifiers. Simple examples are given below:
a.(51) János egyszer csak hasra-esett.
John all-of-a-sudden on-stomach-fell
‘All of a sudden, John fell on his face.’
b.#János egyszer csak magas volt.
John all-of-a-sudden tall was
#‘All of a sudden, John was tall.’
Actually, to be more precise, the only way a durative can be interpreted
when combined with such a temporal modifier is if it can be taken to
denote one instance in a series of occurrences (henceforth “SoO”), as in:
a.(52) Minden magas gyerek átment egy másik iskolába.
every tall child went a other school-into
‘Every tall kid transferred to another school.’
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 60, 2013
Adverbial clauses with -ig and the “until-puzzle” 333
b. Aznap a tornaórán János egyszer csak magas volt.
that-day the P.E. class-on John all-of-a-sudden tall was
‘That day in P.E. class, John was tall all of a sudden.’
Imagine a situation where kids are lined up according to height at the start
of each physical education class. John, who is not very tall, is generally not
considered tall at these line-ups, so he ends up standing somewhere down
the line. On this day, however, with all the taller kids gone, he is all of a
sudden evaluated as tall. This is, of course, a special interpretation that is
not always available or preferred but it requires contextual help. I will not
go into how this reading can be analyzed in terms of event structure, as this
would lead this discussion too far off topic. The point is simply that, under
special circumstances, durative (even stative) events can be modified by a
punctual time adverbial, and this happens when some requirement dictates
that only a punctual interpretation is acceptable. This means that punctual
temporal modifiers like egyszer csak ‘all of a sudden’ do not lexically specify
the type of predicate they can combine with. (See the analogous treatment
of the combinability of duratives with telic predicates in M&Ü and above in
the previous section.) Rather, the temporal specification of the eventuality
in the scope of such a modifier must be a time point (rather than a time
period), and to the extent that this is possible, the sentence is interpretable.
Therefore, we can use this special SoO reading as a diagnostic to detect
whether an eventuality (regardless of the type of predicate) is interpreted
as describing a time point or a time period. First, observe that there is no
difficulty in inserting ‘all of a sudden’ into the simple example where the
embedded event is punctual:
(53) A szobában beszélgettünk, ameddig egyszer csak kialudt a villany.
the room-in we-talked dem-wh-until all-of-a-sudden prt-slept the light
‘We talked in the room until, suddenly, the lights went out.’
This is less than surprising since in this case the embedded clause clearly
features a punctual event. In this example, we are dealing with an event
relative, where the two arguments of until are simply provided by the two
eventuality descriptions in the two clauses, without any further complica-
tions, as discussed in the previous section with reference to the analogous
example (47a). Now, let us look at a construction like (48) above – the one
claimed to be a TR structure – in terms of modification:
(54) A szobában beszélgettünk, ameddig (#egyszer csak) főtt a vacsora.
the room-in we-talked dem-wh-until all-of-a-sudden cooked the dinner
‘We talked in the room while dinner was cooking.’
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As shown above for a simple example, the combination of ‘all of a sud-
den’ with a durative or stative is only possible with a special context and
interpretation, where the atelic event can be taken to be one in a series
of similar occurrences (the SoO reading). Accordingly, (54) can actually
be made sense of in a context where, for example, we are talking in the
room and keep popping into the kitchen to check whether the dinner is
cooking in there. Through a series of such checking events, we always find
that the dinner is not cooking, so we keep talking. Finally, it happens that
we check the kitchen once more and find that the dinner is cooking, so we
stop talking. On this special interpretation, (54) is actually acceptable.
Now recall that we predict that:
(a) when the embedded eventuality is non-punctual, we are dealing
with a TR structure, and we have operator movement from inside the
adverbial clause > hence, the low reading is available, and
(b) when the embedded eventuality is punctual, we are looking at an
ER structure, with no long operator movement > hence, the low reading
is not available.
Above we saw that, in the case when the embedded eventuality is
durative or stative, the low reading is normally available. This means that
this reading should become unavailable when the punctual interpretation
is enforced on the embedded clause, and this appears to hold. Compare
(55) below:
a.(55) Temporal relative construction (embedded clause non-punctual)
– Low construal OK
A szobában beszélgettünk, ameddig mondtad, hogy főtt a vacsora.
the room-in we-talked dem-wh-until you-said comp cooked the dinner
LR: ‘We talked in the room until time t. You said that dinner was cooking until
time t.’
HR: ‘We talked in the room while you kept saying that the dinner was cooking.’
b. Event relative construction (embedded clause punctual)
– Low construal out
A szobában beszélgettünk, ameddig mondtad, hogy egyszer csak
the room-in we-talked dem-wh-until you-said Comp all-of-a-sudden
főtt a vacsora.
cooked the dinner
What this shows is that in the (a) example the embedded event is not
interpreted as punctual – and hence the structure is a TR structure and
the low reading is available. Meanwhile, when we force the punctual inter-
pretation on the embedded clause, the only available derivation is the ER
derivation, and the low reading disappears. This enforces the structural
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difference between the two derivations for adverbial clauses, since the con-
trast above requires reference to the type of temporal modification that is
available in a certain context. Whenever punctual modification is present,
the event relative use of until becomes the only possible option, and this
is supported by the absence of the low reading in this construction.
Now let us see what happens in the “predicate negation” variant (47b),
illustrated once again below:
(56) Examples of the “predicate negation” type of until-construction
a. Itthon maradok, ameddig Emma nem jön haza.
home I-stay dem-wh-until Emma neg comes home
b. A szobában beszélgettünk, ameddig nem aludt ki a villany.
the room-in we-talked dem-wh-until neg slept prt the light
‘We talked in the room until the light went out.’
c. Ameddig nem zárul le a választás, tovább él a kampánycsend.
dem-wh-until neg closes prt the election further lives the campaign silence
‘Until the elections are closed, the campaign silence [ban on campaigning]
remains in eﬀect.’
d. Ameddig nem szólok be nektek, ti se tegyétek!
dem-wh-until neg I-tell prt you-dat you-pl neither do-2sg-imp
‘Until I insult you, you should not do it [insult me] either.’
Examples (a) and (b) above are constructed while (c) and (d) are attested
examples. As mentioned in the introduction to this section, native speaker
intuition about these examples is that they feature two simultaneously
ongoing situations; e.g., in (a) above, the time period of staying home
coincides with the time period of Emma not coming home, or in (b) the
time of talking in the room matches the time during which the light is
not out (i.e., while it is on). In this sense, these examples are analogous
to the non-negated (48) featuring a durative in the embedded clause. As
such, the prediction is that the structure of these examples is temporal
relativization, as illustrated in the simplified structure in (57):
a.(57) Temporal relative construction with until (cf. (48))
[I will stay home [until t]i [Emma is at work [until t]i]
b. Temporal relative structure with an until-clause featuring predicate negation
(cf. (47b))
[[I will stay home [until t]i [Emma does not come home [until t]i]
There are two things that I want to briefly note about the structure in
(57b). Firstly, the embedded clause closely resembles English examples like
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Emma didn’t come home until 5. in that it features negation of an eventive
predicate, and we have the until-phrase raising over negation to the left pe-
riphery of the embedded clause (in this case, in a form of wh-movement).
Second, in contrast to the English examples, this construction in Hun-
garian does not result in the “switch reading” (unlike the construction in
(47c), featuring the unorthodox Prt–Neg–V word order, which I return to
below). (56d), for example, carries no implication that the speaker has the
intention of ever insulting the listeners. Rather, the natural interpretation
is one where (s)he is civil to the listeners and is asking them to reciprocate
with similar behavior. This means that the switch reading is not a direct
result of negation being present in the relevant clause, and not even a sim-
ple derivative of until outscoping negation. Rather, what is required is a
contrastive reading on the until-phrase, which does not obtain in examples
like (57b) since the until-phrase raises because it is relativized, not because
of contrastive topicalization that M&Ü posit in English. In fact, we do not
expect contrastive topicalization to be allowed inside until-clauses in the
default case. I return to the availability of the switch reading in Hungarian
below, after the discussion of the predicate negation variant at hand.
If this is correct, we expect the low construal to be available for this
type of construction, and it is:
(58) Temporal relatives with until – low construal is available
(with or without negation)
a. Itthon maradok, ameddig mondtad, hogy Emma munkában van.
home I-stay dem-wh-until you-said Comp Emma work-in is
LR: ‘You told me that Emma will be at work until time t. I will stay home
until time t.’
b. Itthon maradok, ameddig mondtad, hogy Emma nem jön haza.
home I-stay dem-wh-until you-said Comp Emma neg comes home
LR: ‘You told me that Emma will not come home until time t. I will stay home
until time t.’
In the examples above, the high reading has been excluded by the choice
of verb tense in the middle clause in order to keep the examples simple.
What we see, then, is that the negated eventive in the (b) example behaves
the same as the stative in (a) in that it clearly makes the temporal rel-
ative construction possible, given that we take the availability of the low
construal as indicative of long operator movement.
It would seem, then, that we have found evidence for the stativizing
effect of negation, since negation appears to create a suitable non-punctual
argument for until in the embedded clause (with its punctual argument
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being the endpoint that is relativized in the construction). Recall, however,
that the discussion of English until-constructions has shown that this ef-
fect is only apparent. Rather, when we have a negated eventive combining
with durative modification (or, more precisely, in a configuration that en-
forces a durative interpretation, as in the durative complement of until)
the interpretation defaults to every instant of the reference time, and we
understand the example to mean ‘Until time t, in every instant it was true
that X didn’t happen.’ Meanwhile, M&Ü also show that durative modifi-
cation does not in fact require the presence of negation with an eventive
predicate, as on an iterative interpretation most telic predicates are fine
with a durative temporal modifier. Duratives simply define the temporal
dimension of the eventuality that is composed by the different elements
(verb, arguments, operators) in the clause, and to the extent that the two
can be made pragmatically compatible, the sentence will receive an inter-
pretation. If this is true, then the same temporal relative structure should
be available with a non-negated eventive predicate as well, as long as it is
iteratively interpreted (59a) and this structure should also make the low
reading possible (59b):
(59) Temporal relativization with until and an iteratively interpreted eventive predicate
a. Izgultam a meccsen, ameddig Emma (folyton) hibázott.
I-worried the match-on dem-wh-until Emma constantly made-mistakes
‘I was worried at the match while Emma kept making mistakes.’
b. A nézők izgultak, ameddig mondtad, hogy Emma (folyton)
the spectators worried dem-wh-until you-said comp Emma constantly
hibázott.
made-mistakes
HR: ‘The spectators were worried while you kept saying that Emma kept mak-
ing mistakes.’
LR: ‘The spectators were worried until time t. You said that Emma kept mak-
ing mistakes until time t.’
To the extent that complex examples like (59b) can be judged reliably,
it seems to be the case that – if the iterative interpretation can be ac-
cessed – the low reading does become available even with a telic predicate,
showing that the structure is a TR structure. This, once again, means that
the choice between ER and TR does not directly correlate with the type
of predicate featured in the until-clause. Rather, the two structures are
freely available, and are interpreted whenever the reading dictated by the
combination of until, negation or other operators and the predicate type
is comprehensible.
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Now, similarly to the other TR structures, the ones involving negation
also do not easily admit modification by a punctual adverb. This is be-
cause the embedded clause is supposed to provide the durative argument
of until (with the punctual endpoint argument being relativized). However,
punctual modification is marginally possible on the more marked, series of
occurrences (SoO) reading discussed above:
(60) A szobában beszélgettünk, ameddig (#egyszer csak) nem aludt ki a villany.
the room-in we-talked dem-wh-until all-of-a-sudden neg slept prt the light
‘We talked in the room as long as (#all of a sudden) the lights didn’t go out.’
Once again, the usual interpretation here is that the period of the lights
not going out (i.e., being on) coincides with the period of talking in the
room, and on this reading the punctual modifier is not possible for obvi-
ous reasons. When we do get the punctual reading (in a series-of-events
context), the modification is acceptable, for example in a situation where,
during our conversation in the room, one of us keeps switching the light
on and off. When this person turns the light switch off, the lights go out.
At one point, however, the switch breaks and the lights stay on. At this
point, we stop talking (due to surprise, for example). As unlikely as this
scenario is, it is possible to construct this context, and on this reading the
punctual modification is possible. This, however, means that on this read-
ing the embedded event is interpreted as punctual, and thus the structure
must be an ER structure – and we should lose the low reading:
(61) A szobában beszélgettünk, ameddig mondtad, hogy egyszer csak
the room-in we-talked dem-wh-until you-said comp all-of-a-sudden
nem aludt ki a villany.
neg slept prt the light
HR: ‘We talked in the room while you kept saying that the lights all of a sudden
did not go out.’
LR: *‘We talked in the room until time t. You said that at time t the lights suddenly
did not go out.’
As predicted, when we enforce a punctual reading on the most deeply
embedded clause, the low construal becomes quite bad, evidence that this
requires a derivation by event relativization.
The discussion above shows that there is a clear correlation between
(a) the punctual vs. non-punctual interpretation of the complex eventuality
(meaning: the denotation of the predicate combined with various modifiers
and operators) inside the until-clause, and (b) the availability of the low
reading, which I take to be indicative of the structural distinction between
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event relativization vs. temporal relativization. If this is so, then it is in
fact possible to account for the non-negated ER (as in (47a)) and the
‘predicate negation’ TR (as in (47b)) variants in the Hungarian pattern
without positing two kinds of until. We can make do with one until with a
single selectional grid (taking one punctual endpoint and one non-punctual
complement, where ‘non-punctual’ is taken to refer not to the type of
predicate, as discussed above, but to the temporal specification of the
event or series of events depicted in the given clause). So far, the picture
presented can be summarized as shown in the following table:
(62)
From the discussion above, we can safely conclude that the Hungarian data
so far have not necessitated any special machinery – one until has been
sufficient, and negation also has not played any role that is particular to
this construction. We now turn to the question of how the third available
construction (47c) bears on the issues, namely, the selectional properties of
-ig and the role of negation. We will see that the diagnostics shown above
yield very different results for the (47c)-type construction. I will claim,
however, that this contrast does not warrant the introduction of a special
type of negation, or of a special Neg position.
3.3. Two types of negation?
The last remaining variant in the set of Hungarian until-constructions is
the one that features the Prt–Neg–V order (cf. (47c)), repeated below for
convenience:
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(63) Itthon maradok, ameddig Emma haza nem jön.
home I-stay dem-wh-until Emma home neg comes
‘I’ll stay home until Emma comes home.’
This construction is interesting in a number of respects. The most striking
characteristic of these examples is (as also discussed in Piñón 1991) that
this word order is not the default ordering in Hungarian – run-of-the-mill
predicate negation results in the order Neg–V–Prt, as also evidenced in
the “predicate negation” type discussed in the previous section. I return
to this unorthodox word order below. For now, let us look at how this
construction fares on the diagnostics discussed above. The examples be-
low both point in the same direction, namely that the negated eventive
predicate here actually is interpreted as denoting a punctual event. On
one hand, the insertion of the punctual modifier ‘all of a sudden’ does not
result in the marked ‘series of occurrences’ reading but receives the usual
interpretation, as shown by the English translation in (64). Also, the low
reading is unavailable in this construction, which – according to the line of
analysis pursued here – means that the example is derived via event rel-
ativization. Since ER structures are only compatible with until when the
embedded clause denotes a punctual event (as this is required to provide
the endpoint argument selected by until) (65) below also indicates a punc-
tual reading of the embedded clause event. (Contrast these examples with
(60) and (59) above, which feature the normal ordering of Neg.)
(64) A szobában beszélgettünk, ameddig egyszer csak ki nem aludt a villany.
the room-in we-talked dem-wh-until all-of-a-suddent prt neg slept the light
‘We talked in the room until, all of a sudden, the lights went out.’
(65)*Itthon maradok, ameddig mondtad, hogy Emma haza nem jön.
home I-stay dem-wh-until you-said comp Emma home neg comes
*LR: ‘You told me that Emma will not come over until time t. I will stay home
until time t.’
(The high reading is excluded via the tense of the middle clause.)
Thus, this construction patterns for all intents and purposes with the use
of -ig in the non-negated (47a), which was analyzed as involving an event
relative with the relative operator and the suffix originating high up in the
clause. In accordance with the predictions of the earlier sections of this
chapter, the low reading becomes unavailable in (65), suggesting that the
Prt–Neg–V order surfaces in event relative configurations.
Given that in the construction at hand it appears that negation does
not play its usual role (i.e., the negated eventive can be interpreted as punc-
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tual without any special context being required, that is, without having
to resort to the unorthodox SoO reading), the natural question is whether
we are dealing with a kind of “special” negation here. Although I have ar-
gued above (especially based on English) that negation does not actually
create states out of punctual events, and as such, the fact that a negated
eventive can be interpreted as eventive is not, in and of itself, completely
unexpected, the contrast between this variant and the ‘predicate negation’
type still requires an explanation. If we look at the interpretation of (64)
vs. the corresponding example (61) also featuring negation, we find that in
the construction (61) – where the negation and the particle are ordered in
their usual way, and so presumably we are dealing with regular predicate
negation – the punctual interpretation is the marked SoO reading, and the
most natural reading is the one where during the time period in question
the event denoted by the embedded predicate does not take place at any
of the potentially relevant time points (points covering the time period at
hand). Meanwhile, no such reading results in (64), and the interpretation
is very similar to one where no negation is present. I will argue, however,
that the difference between the two constructions is a simple question of
scope, and that negation in the Prt–Neg–V order is generated in the same
position as normal predicate negation but interpreted higher. Since it is
not in the scope of until, negation does not contribute its usual semantics
of negating the event denoted by the embedded predicate but rather par-
ticipates in focus structure, yielding the switch reading associated with this
construction in Hungarian. Below, I discuss the details of this proposal.
Following Abels (2005) with some modifications, I will suggest that nega-
tion in this construction moves to an operator position high up in the left
periphery. On this scenario, the P element originates outside the clause,
so we have no long operator movement from inside TP, and the lack of
the low reading is predicted in (65). For ease of exposition (and somewhat
pre-theoretically) I will from now on refer to the event relative construc-
tion involving negation that is interpreted outside the TP domain (to be
demonstrated below) as the ‘Neg-raising construction’ and the temporal
relative variety (where we observe the normal effects of negation inter-
preted in its base position) as the ‘predicate negation construction’. The
rough representations of the surface structures of the two constructions
are given in (66):
a.(66) (=47b) [NegP Neg V [PredP Prt . . . ]]
b. (=47c) [FocP Prt [NegP Neg V . . . ]]
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Before going on to present evidence for the LF raising of negation from
its base position shown in (66b) above, a note on the word order will be
instructive. Given the fixed hierarchy of the functional projections domi-
nating the VP in Hungarian (relevantly: FocP>NegP>PredP>VP),11 the
only way to get the Prt–Neg–V order without positing a special position
for negation or for the particle is to assume that the particle is in focus in
the Neg-raising construction. This is in fact what is suggested by Piñón
(1991). Although the focusing of the particle and hence the Prt–Neg–V
order are (contrary to Piñón’s claims) not obligatory (albeit preferred) in
the Neg-raising construction, the schematic representation given in (66b)
will suffice for the purposes of the main portion of this discussion. The
question of why focusing some element (typically the particle) tends to
go together with Neg-raising is an interesting one that I return to at the
end of this section, where I discuss the relationship between focus and
Neg-raising in some detail.
There are two main advantages to the Neg-raising approach, namely
that it makes it possible to analyze the suffix -ig as having a single se-
lectional grid (since we can derive a difference between the behavior of
TR structures involving regular predicate negation and ER structures fea-
turing Neg-raising), and it also does not require reference to expletive or
semantically empty negation (which is a theoretically undesirable concept
to begin with). In addition to these points, the Neg-raising analysis of
(47c) also receives support from a number of syntactic observations. I dis-
cuss these below, before turning my attention to the issue of motivation
for Neg-raising, and the particularities of the Prt–Neg–V word order.
The first observation concerns the licensing of negative quantifiers.
Recall the Russian data from section 1. Arguing against the “expletive
negation” analysis of Brown & Franks (1995; 1997), Abels (2005) discusses
examples from Russian where negation inside until-clauses fails to license
negative quantifiers that normally require clause-mate Neg ((67b) repeated
from (12) above for convenience):
a.(67) Ja podoždu poka ty ne prideš.
I will-wait until you neg arrive
‘I’ll wait for you until you arrive.’
11 Whether or not FocP and NegP are distinct from TP (which, in a neutral sentence
containing no focus or negation, will house the tensed verb in its head and attract
the content of Spec,PredP to its speciﬁer) or not is irrelevant here, and a much
debated issue of Hungarian syntax. When there is both focus and negation in a
sentence, the verb appears immediately after these, resulting in a Foc-Neg-V(-Prt)
order, and it is only this order that is important for the purposes of this discussion.
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b. Ja podoždu poka {Xkto-nibuď/ *nikto} ne pridet.
I will-wait until who-nibud’ ni-who neg arrive
‘I will wait until someone comes.’12
The Russian data show that negation in the until-clause (which is claimed
to be obligatory) does not license the negative indefinite nikto, and the
negative pronominal kto-nibuď is used instead, which is normally licensed
by superordinate negation. While Brown and Franks take this example
to show that the negation that occurs in until-clauses is expletive (they
discuss a number of other contrasts between this negation and run-of-the-
mill predicate negation which fall outside the scope of this discussion),
Abels argues that expletive negation does not exist, and that what we
witness here is LF-raising of negation into the matrix clause, which explains
why this negation patterns with matrix negation in terms of NPI-licensing.
Before outlining the technicalities of Abels’ analysis, a note on the data is
in order here. Similar data can be duplicated in Serbian:
(68) Serbian
a. Moraš da radiš dok ne zaposlimo nekog/*nikog.
you-must comp you-work until neg we-hire someone/no one
‘You have to work until we hire someone.’
b. Ne zapošljavamo nikog.
neg we-hire no one
‘We are not hiring anyone.’
As seen in (68b), clausemate negation normally licenses the negative quan-
tifier nikog. Meanwhile, the same is not available in until-clauses, on par-
allel with the Russian data. However, it is not entirely correct to say that
negation here patterns with superordinate negation because NPI’s that
are usually licensed long-distance in embedding constructions are also not
available in until-clauses, as shown below:
(69) Serbian
a. Ne mislim da će iko stići/da stigne.
neg I-think comp will anyone come-inf/comp he-comes
‘I don’t think that anyone will come.’
b. Osta-ću dok neko/*iko/??niko ne stigne.
I-stay-fut until someone/anyone/no one neg comes
‘I will stay here until anyone comes.’
12 The examples are from Abels (2005), who cites Brown & Franks (1995) for them.
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It appears to be the case that negation in until-clauses, at least in Serbian
(and in Hungarian, as shown below), does not license either type of n-
word – niko requiring clausemate negation and iko requiring long-distance
licensing are equally bad. This suggests that negation in these construc-
tions occupies an intermediate LF position in the embedded CP-domain,
too high to be a clausemate licensor but too low for long-distance licensing.
This is interesting because there have been claims about Serbo-Croatian
(e.g., Progovac 1994) that the two kinds of NPIs in this language are in
complementary distribution such that negation in any possible position
will license one or the other. It seems that at least in this one construction
this does not hold, with the possible explanation that negation here actu-
ally raises outside until but not as high as the matrix clause – remaining
in the CP-layer of the temporal adverbial clause. While this may seem ad
hoc at first, there is some evidence that negation in the CP domain shares
some of the properties of negation in until-clauses argued to feature covert
Neg-raising. For example, negation that is clearly in the CP domain also
does not license either NPI type.
(70) Serbian
Nije li Jovan/*iko/*niko stigao danas?
neg-aux q Jovan/NPI1/NPI2 arrived today
‘Didn’t John arrive today?’ (‘Wasn’t John supposed to arrive today?’)13
In emphatic negated questions, Serbo-Croatian features a negative auxil-
iary in the CP layer that, unlike the same auxiliary when it appears lower
in the clause, cannot license either NPI-type. Arguably, this is because
it is in the relevant intermediate position. Similar examples can also be
constructed in English.
(71) Didn’t John earn a fortune/*a penny? (cf. He didn’t earn a penny.)
The right account, therefore – in accordance with Abels (2005) but with
some modification to accommodate the NPI-licensing data – seems to be
that negation in Slavic until-clauses raises just outside until, possibly left-
adjoining to it, analogously to English negative preposing examples with
until such as:
a.(72) Not until John/*anyone comes home will I start dinner.
b. I won’t start dinner until anyone comes home.
13 Thanks to Nataša Miličević for the example. Also see Miličević (2007) for discussion
of this construction.
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As (72a) shows, ‘not-until’ is a possible surface ordering in English (while
in Slavic it seems to only obtain in LF) but negation in this position also
does not license NPIs. Therefore, I will assume that LF Neg-raising fronts
the negative element to the left of the complementizer (or preposition, as
the case may be) heading the adverbial clause. I return to the relationship
between the combination of ‘not-until’ and focus structure below. For now,
assume that LF Neg-raising combines these two elements in some way in
the embedded CP domain.
Returning to Hungarian, we find data that are similar to the Slavic
facts discussed. Unlike in Russian, however, in Hungarian there are two
different until-constructions that involve negation. Without going into the
details of n-word licensing, it is sufficient to note here that negative quan-
tifiers are only licensed in the ‘predicate negation’ construction, and dis-
allowed in the ‘Neg-raising’ construction:14
a.(73) Ameddig nem veszünk fel senkit, többet kell dolgoznod.
dem-wh-until neg we-hire prt nobody-acc more-acc must you-work-inf
‘Until we hire someone, you have to work more.’
b. *Ameddig fel nem veszünk senkit . . .
dem-wh-until prt neg we-hire nobody-acc
As shown by the contrast in (73), run-of-the-mill predicate negation has no
trouble licensing the negative quantifier senkit ‘nobody-acc’ in object po-
sition inside an -ig-clause, while the same configuration is ungrammatical
in the Prt–Neg–V order. In this, the negation in the (a) example behaves
exactly like regular predicate negation in a monoclausal structure. If we
want to maintain that negation is always generated in the same position
(cf. (67)) and cannot be generated in other places (see Abels 2005 for the
same point), it seems like an obvious step to relate this fact to the posited
Neg-raising in this construction, and claim that (just like in Russian) this
instance of negation is unable to license negative quantifiers because these
require a clausemate licensor but negation is too high at LF for this. In
accordance with the Slavic examples, the same pattern obtains for Hun-
garian, and NPIs that are usually licensed by superordinate negation are
14 In fact, the situation is somewhat complicated by the fact that negative quantiﬁers
in Hungarian can appear in a number of diﬀerent positions (inside VP, in a higher
position to which they QR, and potentially in focus; see Olsvay (2006) and Surányi
2006 for discussion) and they receive diﬀerent interpretations in these positions.
Preliminary ﬁndings indicate that the position (and hence interpretation) of the
n-word also plays a role in the acceptability of the data discussed here. I leave this
question open for future research.
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also not acceptable in this construction. Observe the following (cf. (69) for
Serbian above):
a.(74) Nem hiszem, hogy valaki is el-jön.
neg I-believe comp anyone prt-comes
‘I don’t think anyone will come.’
b. Itt maradok, ameddig valaki is el nem jön.
here I-stay dem-wh-until anyone prt neg comes
Intended: ‘I will stay here until someone/anyone comes.
As (a) shows, valaki is is the type of NPI in Hungarian that is licensed
long-distance, just like iko in Serbo-Croatian, and, as (b) attests, it is also
not grammatical in until-constructions. Therefore, I will carry on under
the assumption that negation raises to the same left-peripheral position in
Hungarian and Slavic.
Now, the data and generalizations above are certainly compatible with
a Neg-raising analysis but, as Brown & Franks (1995, 1997) argue for
Russian, an alternative (although perhaps not very attractive) account is
also possible, namely that negation in until-clauses simply lacks “negative
force”. That is, it is not real negation, and therefore cannot be expected
to license NPIs. This line of analysis would face the obvious objections
that positing such an empty instance of negation adds unnecessary and
implausible complications to the grammar (negation, being a basic logical
operator, is unlikely to have a semantically vacuous counterpart), and that
positing such unconstrained lexical duplication, especially of functional
items, is not a desirable course of action in general. There is, in addition,
evidence that negation in the Neg-raising constructions is actually active,
can take scope over other operators, and interacts with focus structure.
Let us turn to these data.
Some evidence for the LF raising of negation in the Prt–Neg–V order
comes from scope facts. To start, observe the scope relations between the
sentence adverb biztosan ‘surely, certainly’ and negation:
a.(75) Itt maradok, ameddig Emma biztosan nem alszik el.
here I-stay dem-wh-until Emma certainly neg sleeps prt
Adv>Neg: ‘I will stay during the time period for which it is certain that Emma
will not fall asleep.’
b. Itt maradok, ameddig Emma biztosan el nem alszik.
here I-stay dem-wh-until Emma certainly prt neg sleeps
Neg>Adv: ‘I will stay as long as it is not certain that Emma has fallen asleep.’
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c. Emma biztosan nem alszik el.
Emma certainly neg sleeps prt
Adv>Neg: ‘Emma will certainly not fall asleep.’
As (75c) indicates, the relative scopes of the adverb and negation normally
reflect the surface order (cf. Egedi 2009 for extensive discussion of sentence
adverbs and their scope properties). This extends to the predicate nega-
tion construction in (75a), which is a case of regular predicate negation
being interpreted in its surface position. (75b), at the same time, presents
a non-linear scope order that is not attested in non-raising contexts. The
Neg-raising analysis accounts for this fact straightforwardly, while positing
semantically empty negation in this example would not be helpful. This
use of biztosan is actually predicative, as the adverb is a predicate that
takes the entire proposition as its complement. (75c) means something
like ‘It is certain that [Emma will not fall asleep].’ The English transla-
tions of (a) and (b) show that this is in fact the interpretation that we
get in the examples with until-clauses as well, which causes no problem
in (a) because this is a temporal relative construction, where both clauses
denote durative/stative propositions. Therefore, there is no difficulty with
construing the two arguments of until as two time periods: the matrix
clause scenario, and the period of certainty. This also works in the (b)
example, showing that negation in this case is able to modify the sentence
adverb biztosan, which is clearly outside the surface position of negation,
and which is therefore not an option in the usual predicate negation struc-
ture (where negation takes surface scope). This means that the reading
we get in the (b) example should be distinct from the one we get without
negation, so compare (75b) to (76) below:
(76)??Itt maradok, ameddig Emma biztosan el-alszik.
here I-stay dem-wh-until Emma certainly prt-sleeps
Intended: ‘I will stay as long as it is certain that Emma has fallen asleep.’
This example is marginal, and in my view this is because it is difficult to
imagine the reversal of the situation at the time point relativized in the
construction. While a transition from uncertainty to certainty is plausi-
ble (that is, waiting until we have certainty that Emma is fast asleep),
the converse is hard to imagine (waiting while her sleeping is certain, and
leaving or doing something else once it is no longer certain). This means
that negation in (75b) is certainly not semantically empty but real nega-
tion that scopes higher than usual. The implicit assumption made in this
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argumentation is that the Neg-raising construction is neatly tied together
with the switch reading, an assumption I will make explicit later on.
Similar scope data can be obtained by looking at interactions be-
tween focus and negation in until-constructions. What we find is that
the instance of negation that LF-fronts to a position outside the tempo-
ral/aspectual domain in the “Neg-raising” construction also takes scope
over focus in the temporal clause – and, conversely, that when the wide
scope of negation over focus is observed, that reading is only compatible
with the event relative diagnostics. The data are complicated by the fact
that focus neutralizes the word order difference between the “Neg-raising”
and the “Neg-as-stativizer” constructions, given that we always have the
surface order given in (77), with the focused element preceding negation:
(77) [FocP XP [NegP Neg V . . . ]]
What this shows, actually, is that – contrary to what is claimed by Piñón
(1991) – it cannot be the case that in the Neg-raising construction the
particle is obligatorily focused. This assumption is problematic anyway
because in these constructions we do not see post-focal deaccenting on
the VP, which is incompatible with a constituent focus account, at least
without auxiliary stipulations. Rather, the right generalization is that Neg-
raising constructions obligatorily involve focus, and this role is fulfilled by
the particle in the default, most common case, but the focusing of another
element is equally acceptable, so – as we will see below – we can find ex-
amples with some XP in focus and negation inside the until-clause that
match the diagnostics for event relativization, which in turn means that
they feature Neg-raising. One way to account for this is to say that what is
focused in these constructions is in fact the entire complex VP, and, as is
standard in Hungarian, VP-focus is realized by the overt fronting of some
element inside the VP but not accompanied by post-focal compression.
Without going into the technicalities, similar instances of VP-focus are
discussed, among others, by Kenesei (1998) based on examples like this
(his (19)):
(78) Péter a Hamletet olvasta fel Marinak,
Peter the Hamlet-acc read prt Mary-dat
míg János az autót szedte apró darabokra.
while John the car-acc took small pieces-sub
‘Peter was reading out Hamlet to Mary, while John was taking the car apart into
small pieces.’
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Kenesei notes that such constructions, with only one argument fronted
into the syntactic focus position but each VP-internal argument carrying
stress (instead of being subject to post-focal deaccenting) is interpreted
as (contrastive or non-contrastive) VP-focus, meaning that such sentences
can be uttered as replies to VP-questions likeWhat did Peter do? or can be
contrastively read, as suggested by the example in (78). This means that,
structurally, the analysis positing the focus-fronting of the particle (or,
in less common examples, of another VP-internal element) in Neg-raising
constructions is essentially correct, and the observation that the intonation
of these examples is not the one that is typical for focus constructions
would be explained by the fact that they involve VP-focus rather than
constituent focus. While this idea clearly needs to be worked out in more
detail, below I will provide some evidence that Neg-raising constructions
actually involve focus on the event that is being relativized. For now, let
us return to the scope facts.
Evidence to support the Neg-raising analysis can be found in examples
demonstrating that negation takes scope over focus in these cases. To start,
witness the ambiguity in (79):
(79) Itt maradok, ameddig János nem lép fel.
here I-stay dem-wh-until John Neg steps prt
Focus > Neg: ‘I will stay as long as the following holds: It is John (and not someone
else) who is not performing on stage.’
Neg > Focus: ‘I will stay as long as the following does not happen: It is John (and
not someone else) who steps out on stage.’
The Foc>Neg reading is interpreted in a scenario where there is always
a single person who is not on stage (but sitting in the back) and the
until-clause refers to the time period while this person is not John. The
Neg>Foc reading, on the other hand, is the more likely scenario where
there is always one person on stage, and the adverbial clause picks out the
point in time when this one person is John. While the surface scope order
is not surprising (Hungarian is well-known for displaying scope relations
overtly in most cases), the Neg>Focus scope order is arguably derived via
Neg-raising. This example illustrates that, for Neg-raising, it need not be
the particle that is in focus – it can be another element – if in fact the
inverse scope in (79) is derived via the same covert Neg-raising that I
have suggested derives the scope of negation over sentence adverbs like
‘certainly’, and fronts the negation into a position from which it cannot
license negative quantifiers. There are a number of distinct predictions
if the reasoning above is on the right track, that is, if the Neg>Focus
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reading of (79) involves a Neg-raising construction (while the Foc>Neg
reading is a (47b)-type “predicate negation” temporal relative). First, to
the extent that a negative quantifier is licensed in the ambiguous (79), it
should only be compatible with the non-Neg-raising (Focus>Neg) reading
(see (80)). (Recall that negative quantifiers are not licensed in the Neg-
raising configuration.) Second, to the extent that the low reading can be
constructed with (79), it should also enforce the Focus>Neg interpretation
(see (81)). (Once again, recall that low readings are out with event relative
constructions, of which the Neg-raising examples are a subtype.) Third, if
we insert egyszer csak ‘suddenly’ into the example, we should end up with
the Neg>Foc scope order on the single-event, unmarked reading, and the
Foc>Neg scope order should only be compatible on the marked, series-of-
occurrences reading, since this adverb enforces a punctual reading on the
event in the relative clause (see (82)).
(80) Itt maradok, ameddig János nem nyer meg semmit.
here I-stay dem-wh-until John neg wins prt nothing-acc
Focus>Neg: ‘I will stay as long as it is János who wins nothing.’
*Neg>Focus: ‘I will stay as long as it is not true for anything that John has won it.’
(81) Itt maradok, ameddig mondtad, hogy János nem lép fel.
here I-stay dem-wh-until you-said comp John neg steps prt
Focus>Neg: ‘You told me that up until time t it will be John who is not performing
on stage (but sitting in the back). I will stay until time t.’
*Neg>Focus: ‘You told me that until time t it will not be the case that it is John
who is performing on stage. I will stay until time t.’
(82) Unatkoztam, ameddig egyszer csak János nem lépett a színpadra.
I-was-bored dem-wh-until suddenly John neg stepped the stage-onto
i. ‘I was bored until it happened that, suddenly, it was John who stepped out on
the stage.’
ii. ‘There was a series of events when the actors stepped out onto the stage and
one of the actors was always absent from the group. I was bored until the moment
when that person was John.’
All three predictions above are borne out, suggesting that the Neg>Foc
scope order in (79) is in fact a result of the Neg-raising posited in the ER
examples involving negation. Given the claims presented here, the absence
of the low reading in (81) furnishes evidence that -ig in this case originates
outside the adverbial clause, and the construction is an event relative. Once
again, the scope facts demonstrated above make the expletive negation
analysis implausible, and the Neg-raising analysis a viable solution.
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3.4. Neg-raising and focus
Before summing up, I would like to briefly reflect on the relationship be-
tween Neg-raising in until-constructions and focus. I have suggested above
that the ‘switch reading’ is not a lexical property of (one kind of) until, or
directly related to the presence of negation in a sentence. Rather, it is the
result of a contrastive reading on the until-phrase or -clause, which brings
out the said entailment. In what follows, I will attempt to make this idea
more explicit, as well as provide some evidence for it.
In terms of syntactic evidence, we have seen that there is indication
from Hungarian that Neg-raising until-clauses feature focusing (in partic-
ular, VP-focus or similar wide focus) inside the until-clause. This does not
necessarily mean, however, that the clause itself is read contrastively, since
VP-focus is available in matrix clauses, which are clearly not contrastive
themselves. I want to suggest, however, that these until-clauses acquire
a contrastive reading precisely via the posited Neg-raising. The idea that
the interaction of negation and until results in a focus reading is not en-
tirely novel. Mittwoch (1977) suggests that this is what happens in Not
until. . . fronting in English, which are obligatorily contrastive (i.e., they
necessarily have the switch reading). This, in her view, is supported by the
fact that – as discussed by Giannakidou (2002) – the until that results in
the switch reading in Modern Greek is actually a focus particle. The most
explicit proposal along these lines comes from Declerck (1995), who claims
that (even in English) the combination of not+until lexicalizes the same
meaning as only+at, as illustrated in (83):
(83) John didn’t arrive until 3.
Presupposition: John arrived at 3.
Assertion: P holds only at 3.
Meaning: John only arrived at 3 (and not earlier).
This proposal by Declerck diverges from the usual debate about the switch
reading, which normally treats the switch reading as either a pragmatic
implicature or as a strict semantic entailment. In Declerck’s proposal the
actualization is part of the presupposition since it is derived from the focus
structure of the sentence, which in turn is lexically encoded in the item
derived from not+until. While I agree that the switch reading is related
to focus structure, I would argue that it is not down to the lexical items
involved but to the syntactic structure. There are two reasons to believe
this. One, the switch reading can, in certain contexts, be canceled out, as
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shown by Mittwoch (2001). For example, observe the following attested
example from English:
(84) She’s in jail and probably won’t get out until Monday, if then. (from the internet)
According to Mittwoch, the addition of if then cancels out the implicature
that the person will get out of jail on Monday. Obviously, if this implicature
was part of the presupposition, this cancelation would lead to presuppo-
sition failure, and the sentence would be uninterpretable. Perhaps more
importantly, however, it is simply not the case that the combination of
not and until is required for the switch reading to surface. As discussed
for English earlier on, the effect is not limited to negation but also arises
with only-focus, unmarked focus, and universals, and is not particular to
until either since a contrastively interpreted for-phrase can also yield the
same interpretation. Nevertheless, setting aside the issue of lexicalization,
it seems correct to say that the interaction of negation and until does
influence focus structure.
Pursuing a semantic account of the interaction of negation and un-
til in what he analyzes as covert Neg-raising constructions, Abels (2005)
suggests that the presence of negation in the until-clause in Russian is
actually inherently required for the derivation of the switch-reading. The
implementation goes roughly as follows. Poka – the Russian until – takes
three arguments: two propositions and a truth-functional operator which
is negation by stipulation. Basically, this third argument (negation) en-
sures that the values of the two propositions connected by poka have op-
posite values at all times, which is basically another way of formulating
the switch reading. So while the matrix clause has a positive value, the
embedded clause is false, and when the matrix proposition becomes false,
the embedded one switches to true. In this sense, on Abels’ account the
presence of negation is inherently tied to the switch reading, so we can see
why it is crucial to have negation inside these until-clauses. Meanwhile,
Neg-raising is motivated by the fact that negation is taken to be an ar-
gument of poka, so they presumably need to be in a local relationship at
some point in the derivation. Since, according to Abels, the base position
of negation is highly restricted, so that it can only be introduced into the
structure in its standard position, the way to meet this requirement is via
Neg-raising.
While once again relying heavily on the presence of negation to de-
rive the switch reading, the basic spirit of Abels’ account applies to the
current discussion quite well. What we observe is that, in addition to the
two temporal arguments of until, there is a third element, an element of
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contrast, that is necessary for the switch reading to obtain – although it
appears that the contrast can result from various elements and configura-
tions. Still, to keep to the current discussion, the Neg-raising construction
is one of the ways to get this contrast.
If it is true that it is Neg-raising that yields the contrastive read-
ing in the construction at hand, the question becomes whether such con-
trastiveness is encoded formally on the clause, that is, whether “featural
enrichment” of the event operator takes place of the sort that is discussed
with regard to explicitly focused event relatives in Haegeman and Ürögdi
(2010a;b). The relevant examples are given below:
a.(85) János azt nem tudja, hogy Péter tegnap kit látogatott meg.
John dem-acc neg knows comp Peter yesterday who-acc visited prt
‘What John doesn’t know is whom Peter visited yesterday.’
b. John resents that this book Mary read from cover to cover, while the other
(his favorite) she didn’t even open. (cf. ??John resents that this book Mary
read.)
As observed and discussed by Haegeman and Ürögdi (2010a; b), contrastive
elements can only occur in the left periphery of what they label referential
CP’s (or RCPs for short; subsuming factive embedded clauses, condition-
als, and other event relatives) only when the clause itself (i.e., the event
that is relativized in the clause) is read contrastively. This observation
counters the received generalization that focus is not acceptable at all in
these contexts, and suggests that, given the operator movement derivation
Haegeman and Ürögdi suggest for these clauses, i.e., event relatives, con-
trastive elements are not allowed on the left periphery of event relatives
in the default case because they would intervene with the movement of
the event operator. Meanwhile, when the event that is relativized is itself
contrastive, this intervention effect seems to be obviated. This is imple-
mented by Haegeman and Ürögdi via positing featural enrichment of the
event operator that derives these clauses such that in addition to the [wh]
feature it also has a D-linking (or delta) feature, which allows it to over-
come intervention by a contrastive element between its base and target
positions. For the intricate details of the relevant data and the analysis,
I refer the reader to Haegeman & Ürögdi (2010a;b). Interestingly, how-
ever, contrastive topics (or contrastive elements in the CP domain) are
not allowed inside until-clauses in Hungarian or in English, regardless of
whether we are dealing with a Neg-raising structure, evidence that the
contrast here is not encoded on the relative operator:
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a.(86) *Esett az eső, ameddig Péter haza nem ment ernyőért.
fell the rain dem-wh-until Peter home neg went umbrella-for
‘It rained until Péter went home for an umbrella.’
b. *It rained until Peter we sent for an umbrella.
If the analysis outlined here is on the right track, there are two operator
chains crossing the position where the high contrastive element [Péter] is
located, and therefore either of these could potentially cause intervention
leading to ungrammaticality. One possibility is that Neg-raising across this
contrastive topic is not possible. This is unlikely because negation in its
base position is lower than the canonical focus position that, in the ex-
ample at hand, houses the focused particle haza. As argued extensively in
Haegeman & Ürögdi (2010a;b), focus has only an operator feature while
contrastive topics also carry a D-linking feature in the default case. How-
ever, it is unclear why a D-linking (δ) feature should create intervention
for Neg-raising. Therefore, if the focused particle does not cause a problem
for Neg-raising, then neither should a contrastive topic. The other possible
movement that could be disrupted by the fronted contrastive topic is the
movement of the event operator. As mentioned above, non-focused event
relative clauses normally do not allow contrastive topics to surface on their
left periphery, and this is presumably due to the fact that these contrastive
elements (being [+wh] and [+δ]) block the movement of the event operator
(which, in the default case, has only an operator [+wh] feature). If this is
the reason behind the ungrammaticality of (86a), however, then it seems
that the “contrastivity” of Neg-raising until-clauses is not derived via the
featural enrichment of the event operator but is related to the Neg-raising
operation. As we might expect, such high contrastive elements do, in fact,
become available once there is explicit focusing of the clause, which is
evidenced by the presence of the clausal expletive in the matrix clause:
a.(87) (Csak) Addig esett az eső, ameddig Péter haza nem
only dem-until fell the rain dem-wh-until Peter home neg
ment ernyőért.
went umbrella-for
‘It only rained until Péter went home for an umbrella.’
b. It only rained until Peter we sent home for an umbrella.
As such, these until-clauses pattern completely with other event relatives
such as factives and conditionals when it comes to the availability of high
contrastive elements in their left periphery. This means that the contrastive
reading of until-phrases – which, according to the discussion above, is re-
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sponsible for the switch reading – is distinct from the explicit syntactic
focusing of the entire clause illustrated in (87) (which is presumably de-
rived via featural enrichment of the event operator). This explains why
the switch-reading does not render an until-phrase an intervener, so, for
example, (88) shows that there is no featural interaction between the un-
til-phase (interpreted as contrastive) and the event operator used to derive
the clause:
(88) I remember that John didn’t arrive until 5.
The sentence above can easily be read as having the usual entailment that
‘John arrived at or shortly after 5’, even though I have claimed above that
in order to derive this reading, the until-phrase must be taken to take
high scope and be interpreted contrastively. It seems that this is semantic
scope, though, and does not result in LF movement of the until-phrase,
otherwise it would be an intervener to the movement of the event operator,
and thus would be incompatible inside an event relative. A related issue
is that, in English, in situ focus is also not an intervener, and is perfectly
fine in event relatives such as factives:
(89) I resent that you chose John (and not Mary).
This sentence can be read with ‘John’ taking wide scope, where I would
posit that the entire clause is read contrastively. But it can also be read
with narrow scope focus on ‘John’, where it is the identity of your choice
that I resent. Note that the same reading is not possible with fronted focus:
(90)??What John regrets is that the pension fund Mary chose.
This shows that what we are dealing with in the fronting examples is
syntactic intervention, and also suggests that in situ contrastive elements
do not actually front at LF in English. The implications of this observation
are far-reaching and potentially interesting but I do not have sufficient
evidence or research to say anything conclusive about it at this point. The
relevant point that pertains to the discussion at hand is simply that a
contrastive reading does not necessarily involve syntactic movement, and
that the contrastivity of until-phrases apparently does not interact with
D-linking of the event operator used to derive them.
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4. A note on dialectal variation
As mentioned in the introduction to the Hungarian data, not all Hungarian
dialects allow all three of the constructions discussed above. While there
are a number of complex patterns, one striking tendency is that there are
a number of speakers (as far as I can tell, primarily in Eastern Hungary
and Transylvania; henceforth the “Eastern Hungarian” dialect) who reject
both the non-negated and the predicate negation variant, and allow only
what I have referred to above as the Neg-raising construction, repeated
below:
(91) Itthon maradok, ameddig Emma át nem jön.
home I-stay dem-wh-until Emma over not comes
‘I’ll stay home until Emma comes over.’
While this is perhaps less than surprising since in Slavic it has also been
reported that some speakers consider negation in until-clauses obligatory,
what is interesting is that Hungarian speakers who only accept this one
variant of until-constructions also do not agree with a number of the judg-
ments listed above. One point of similarity is that even for these speakers,
the embedded clause appears to describe a punctual event, as shown by
the fact that they accept the following judgments (from (64)–(65)):
(92) A szobában beszélgettünk, ameddig egyszer csak ki nem aludt a villany.
the room-in we-talked dem-wh-until all-of-a-sudden prt neg slept the light
‘We talked in the room until, suddenly, the lights went out.’
(93) Itthon maradok, ameddig mondtad, hogy Emma haza nem jön .
home I-stay dem-wh-until you-said comp Emma home neg comes
*LR: ‘You told me that Emma will not come over until time t. I will stay home
until time t.’
(The high reading is excluded via the tense of the middle clause.)
(92) shows that punctual modification is permissible with an unmarked
interpretation in these until-clauses, and the unavailability of the low con-
strual in (93) furnishes evidence (as noted also by Lipták (2005), who
analyzes this restricted dialect) that we are dealing with an event relative
construction. So far, therefore, the two dialects behave identically with
respect to this construction. When we look further, however, we find that
there are likely to be differences between the structures assigned to (91)
by speakers of the two dialects, meaning that it is not simply the case that
Eastern Hungarian speakers are less liberal when it comes to the variants
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they accept but there is some deeper reason why they only allow one out
of the three options.
Firstly, let us recall that I have argued above that the “less restric-
tive” dialect utilizes completely productive, run-of-the-mill syntax in until-
constructions where negation is generated in its usual position; the particle
in the Prt–Neg–V order was analyzed as being in focus, while negation was
claimed to be interpreted in a higher position (via LF Neg-raising). One
reason for assuming that the particle is in focus in (91) was that (as pointed
out by Piñón (1991)) speakers of the non-restrictive dialect do not allow
focus before the particle (repeated from (86a)):
(94)%Esett az eső, ameddig Péter haza nem ment ernyőért.
fell the rain dem-wh-until Peter home neg went umbrella-for
‘It rained until Péter went home for an umbrella.’
Non-restrictive dialect: *
Eastern Hungarian dialect: OK
This fact is explained, obviously, if the focus position is filled by the par-
ticle. Meanwhile, speakers of the Eastern Hungarian dialect have no prob-
lem with this example, as also shown by the following datum (provided by
Katalin É. Kiss (p.c.)):
(95) Addig maradunk, ameddig János fel nem lép.
dem-until we-stay dem-wh-until John prt neg steps
‘We will stay until János steps out on stage.’
Non-restrictive dialect: *
Eastern Hungarian dialect: OK
This shows that the structure assigned to this construction for the dialect
discussed in the previous section (repeated below) cannot be the right
one for the Eastern Hungarian dialect – even though, as (92) and (93)
show – this dialect also appears to treat this until-construction as an event
relative.
(96) Structure of the Prt–Neg–V order in the non-restrictive dialect:
[FocP Prt [NegP Neg V . . . ]]
Interestingly, there is another difference between the two dialects in terms
of data judgments, namely, that Eastern Hungarian speakers have no prob-
lem with negative quantifiers in this construction (from (73b)):
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(97)%Ameddig fel nem veszünk senkit . . .
dem-wh-until prt neg we-hire nobody-acc
Non-restrictive dialect: *
Eastern Hungarian dialect: OK
This, in turn, shows that – if we accept the analysis of the dialect dealt with
in section 3 – the Eastern Hungarian dialect not only does not feature the
particle in focus in until-constructions but it also does not have LF Neg-
raising. Therefore, while it seems on the surface that the difference between
the two dialects is one of quantity (so that the “more restrictive” dialect
does not allow all of the structures permissible in the “less restrictive” one)
the difference is in fact a deep structural one, and the structures assigned
to the same example (91) must diverge for the two groups of speakers.
The question that I want to address briefly, then, is what structure we
can assign to (91) in the Eastern Hungarian dialect and what are the
consequences.
É. Kiss (2010) argues that certain Modern Hungarian constructions
(including until-clauses) preserve one of the possible word orders available
for negated sentences in Old Hungarian. In particular, the following exam-
ples are given for the default and for the Prt–Neg–V order (her (6); the
glosses are mine):
a.(98) Nem mondom meg.
neg I-tell prt
‘I will not tell.’ (standard ordering for predicate negation in Modern Hungarian)
b. Amíg15 meg nem mondod, . . .
dem-wh-until prt neg you-tell
‘Until you tell, . . . ’
c. Ha azonnal meg nem mondod, . . .
if at-once prt neg you-tell
‘Unless you tell at once, . . . ’
d. Meg ne mondd!
prt neg you-tell-imp
‘Don’t even think about telling!’
e. Meg nem mondom!
prt neg I-tell
‘I will not tell (emphatic)!’
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É. Kiss analyzes these structures as artefacts of the Old Hungarian word
order, which is not productive in Modern Hungarian but only preserved
in a few, at times marginal constructions. While all of these structures are
more or less accepted in all dialects of Modern Hungarian, it is interesting
to note that (b) (as discussed above) and (c) alternate with the default
predicate negation order (at least in the Budapest dialect), while (d) has
an alternative that overtly features negation in a high position:
(99) Ne-hogy meg-mondd.
neg-comp prt-you-tell-imp
‘Don’t even think about telling!’ (cf. (98d))
The structural alternations between these constructions and other possible
word orders show that, in some dialects, the Prt–Neg–V order has been
re-analyzed as a productive word order (with the particle in focus) and it
alternates with other logical options. One of the correlates of the Prt–Neg–
V ordering in the Budapest dialect is LF Neg-raising, which is supported
by the fact that in that dialect negative quantifiers are ungrammatical in
examples (b)–(d) above. (To my ear, (98e) sounds distinctly archaic, so I
find it hard to judge whether NPI-licensing would work in this sentence.)
I take examples like (99) to be an overt Neg-raising variant of the covert
Neg-raising posited for the Prt–Neg–V order in until-constructions, and,
by extension, possibly in the examples (b)–(e) above. Meanwhile, in ac-
cordance with É. Kiss’s claim, we can say that in the dialect that only
accepts the Prt–Neg–V order in these constructions, this non-default or-
dering is an idiom of sorts, and as such has not been re-analyzed as a focus
construction. (Recall that in Modern Hungarian, the only way the particle
can end up left-adjacent to negation is if it is focused, so the absence of
re-analysis in this case would mean that the speakers treat this order as a
“syntactic idiom”.) As such, these structures preserve the Old Hungarian
ordering where negation does not project but it adjoins to the predicate,
so the verb and negation form a constituent in T, and the particle is in its
usual, neutral position. Given that this construction does not involve focus
for these speakers, it becomes clear why constituent focus in (94)–(95) is
grammatical for them. For É. Kiss, the structure yielding this word order
is the following:
(100) [TP Prt [T′ [T Neg V] VP ]
15 Amíg is a phonological variant of ameddig, which I have used in my examples
because of its morphological transparency. The two forms are interchangeable for
most speakers.
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While arguing for or against the structure above falls outside the scope
of this discussion, it becomes clear that – accepting É. Kiss’s argument
that for Eastern Hungarian speakers, the Prt–Neg–V ordering is a historic
remnant that is not productively analyzed – this proposal works for the
focus data. Meanwhile, the licensing of negative quantifiers (acceptable for
Eastern Hungarian speakers in all of the structures in (98b–e) but out
for speakers of the dialect utilizing the Neg-raising construction) is plau-
sibly related to the fact that, as É. Kiss shows, in the relevant version of
Old Hungarian, in which the Prt–Neg–V order was at least as common
as the currently default Neg–V–Prt ordering, negative quantifiers still had
negative force and did not require licensing by negation. It is possible
that speakers that retained some portions of this old grammar allow nega-
tive quantifiers to surface without c-commanding negation in these archaic
structures, although it is unclear how such an analysis should be properly
constrained in order to predict that even these speakers do not permit
negative quantifiers to surface in sentences completely lacking negation. It
is also possible that negation in T is a possible licensor for these speakers.
(We do not have a minimal pair to test if NPI-licensing from this position
is possible for the speakers of the Budapest dialect since these speakers
do not have the adjunction structure given in (100).) One clear outcome
of (100) is that (covert or overt) Neg-raising is predicted to be impossible
because negation attaches to the tensed verb by head-adjunction, so it can
presumably not move out of this constituent. It is also a question why it
should be these particular constructions (the ones listed under (98)) that
kept the Old Hungarian structure. And finally, it is less than obvious how
these speakers differentiate ‘normal’ predicate negation (the Neg–V–Prt
order) from this archaic order in their grammar so that structures involv-
ing this adjoined negation are interpreted as denoting punctual events, as
evidenced by the fact that they allow modification by punctual adverbs
without yielding the marked SoO reading, and can supply the endpoint
argument in an until-construction as shown by the fact that they facilitate
the low construal. I do not have anything enlightening to say about these
questions at this point, so I leave them open for future research.
In conclusion, let me sum up the findings of this section. Despite its
complexities, the least restrictive dialect of Hungarian – the one that dis-
plays the three-way contrast illustrated under (47) – can be accounted for
without reference to lexical ambiguity of the -ig suffix, or having to evoke a
special type or position of negation. Rather, it has been argued that there
is only one lexical item -ig involved in all three constructions. This suffix
takes two arguments (one durative and one punctual), fixing the latter
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as the endpoint of the former. This strict view of the suffix’s selectional
properties necessitates a covert operation (raising negation from its usual
position in NegP to a position outside the temporal domain of the em-
bedded clause) in configurations where the P element originates outside
the adverbial clause as a connective (the event relative derivation). This
raising of negation at LF was evidenced by a number of diagnostics (scope
relations between negation and sentence adverbs or focus, the inability of
this negation to license negative quantifiers inside the adverbial clause,
etc.). Thus, the account I have outlined for the examples in (47) – the
non-negated ER construction, the “predicate negation” TR variant, and
the “Neg-raising” ER structure – supports the “single-until” line of ap-
proaches. In addition, it shows that the three distinct occurrences of -ig
can be analyzed in terms of structural ambiguity (that is, this P element
can form both temporal relatives and event relatives), whereas the rest of
its properties (particularly, its interaction with negation) are explained by
and in turn influence the semantics of each construction.
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